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SEGREGATION BY CITIZENSHIP
Emma Kaufman∗
For centuries, prisoners in the United States were housed together regardless of their
citizenship status. That changed in 1999 when the federal government began to send
noncitizens into separate prisons. Today, tens of thousands of people — more than half of
all noncitizens in federal prison — live in an institution segregated by citizenship. The
vast majority of these people are Mexican nationals. Nearly all of them are Latino.
The rise of the all-foreign prison raises pressing questions about federal immigration power
and noncitizens’ equal protection rights. Yet no legal scholarship examines these unusual
institutions. Few even know they exist. Drawing on extensive data from the Bureau of
Prisons, internal agency documents, interviews, and other primary sources, this Article
provides the first account of the all-foreign prison. It notes that these prisons are insulated
from meaningful judicial review by an alienage jurisprudence that affords deference to any
federal policy characterized as migration control. And it critiques this doctrine, arguing
that courts need a more coherent and defensible conception of the relationship between
national sovereignty and noncitizens’ equal protection rights. To that end, this Article
advances a simple claim: only core immigration activities — setting rules on entry, exit,
and naturalization — should count as migration control. Other species of state action,
including segregating foreign national prisoners, may affect where and how immigrants
live their lives. But they are not the kind of migration control that warrants deference
from federal courts.

INTRODUCTION

I

mmigration and prisons are two of the most fraught issues in American
society. Every day, headlines announce new turns in national debates
over which immigrants to admit and what to do about the country’s
bloated prisons and jails. Today, roughly 2.3 million people live in a
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custodial institution,1 one in three noncitizens is deportable,2 and it is
increasingly difficult to tell the difference between policing crime and
regulating the border.
Yet at the most acute point of overlap between immigration and imprisonment, we know next to nothing. Despite enormous public interest
in the fate of “foreign criminals,” legal scholars have paid scant attention
to noncitizens inside American prisons. Instead, those who study the
intersection of criminal and immigration law tend to focus on the front
end of the justice system — on legislatures, police, prosecutors, and
courts.3 This framework downplays the prison’s central role in American
immigration policy. It also obscures a remarkable development in
American prison history.
For nearly two centuries, prisoners in the United States were housed
together regardless of their citizenship status. Prison officials have long
documented prisoners’ nationalities — prison records include prisoners’
“nativity” as far back as 1850 — but until recently, citizenship had little
to do with where prisoners were held.4 That changed in the 1990s when
the Federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP) began to send noncitizens into separate, segregated prisons.
Initially, the all-foreign prison was an isolated experiment in central
California and western New Mexico.5 Soon, however, this model of incarceration spread. There are now ten all-foreign prisons across seven
states, and the Trump Administration has announced plans to build
more.6 These prisons hold people serving criminal sentences for a range
of offenses, including drug, violent, and other non-immigration crimes.7
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
1 Peter Wagner & Wendy Sawyer, Mass Incarceration: The Whole Pie 2018, PRISON POL’Y
INITIATIVE (Mar. 14, 2018), https://www.prisonpolicy.org/reports/pie2018.html [https://perma.cc/
5AAU-FUFC].
2 Adam B. Cox & Cristina M. Rodríguez, The President and Immigration Law, 119 YALE L.J.
458, 513 (2009) (“[O]ver thirty percent of all noncitizens living in the United States are deportable . . . because they have either entered illegally or overstayed their visas.”).
3 See, e.g., Ingrid V. Eagly, Prosecuting Immigrants in a Democracy, in PROSECUTORS AND
DEMOCRACY: A CROSS-NATIONAL STUDY 227 (Máximo Langer & David Alan Sklansky eds.,
2017) (prosecutors); Jennifer M. Chacón, Overcriminalizing Immigration, 102 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 613 (2012) (legislatures); Adam B. Cox & Thomas J. Miles, Policing Immigration,
80 U. CHI. L. REV. 87 (2013) (police); Michael T. Light, Michael Massoglia & Ryan D. King, Citizenship and Punishment: The Salience of National Membership in U.S. Criminal Courts, 79 AM.
SOC. REV. 825 (2014) (courts).
4 See infra section I.A, pp. 1388-94.
5 See infra pp. 1401–02; see also Notice of Intent to Prepare a Draft Environmental Impact
Statement (DEIS) for Housing Criminal Alien Population in Non-Federal Low-Security Correctional Facilities, 64 Fed. Reg. 20,021, 20,021–22 (proposed Apr. 23, 1999) (soliciting proposals for
the first all-foreign prison).
6 See infra p. 1402; Fed. Bureau of Prisons, RFP-PCC-0026, Solicitation, Offer, and Award
(May 25, 2017) (on file with the Harvard Law School Library) (soliciting bids for a new all-foreign
prison).
7 See infra note 169 and accompanying text. This Article draws on a large data set obtained
from BOP through the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2012 & Supp. 2016).
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These are, in other words, criminal penal institutions, not civil immigration detention centers. On any given day, they house roughly 19,000
people.8 To put that figure in perspective, ten percent of all federal
prisoners — and more than half of all noncitizens in federal prison —
live in an institution segregated by citizenship.9 The vast majority of
these people are Mexican nationals.10 Nearly all of them are Latino.11
The rise of the all-foreign prison raises pressing questions about the
purpose of punishment, the relationship between citizenship and race,
and the rights of noncitizens inside the United States. Yet no legal scholarship examines this peculiar form of imprisonment. Few even know
these prisons exist. This Article offers the first assessment of America’s
all-foreign prisons. Drawing on a wide range of sources12 — including
archival materials, legal opinions, federal regulations, private prison
contracts, penal policies, interviews, and previously undisclosed data obtained from the Bureau of Prisons through the Freedom of Information
Act13 (FOIA) — it documents the birth of the all-foreign prison. It critiques the legal framework that enabled these institutions. And it grapples with the practical and normative implications of a prison system
stratified by alienage.
The Article’s core claim is that, in the name of migration control,
prison officials have built a second-class system of punishment for
noncitizens. All-foreign prisons are not only places where foreigners are
separated from the rest of the penal population. They are also stripped–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
See Letter from A. Cromer, Fed. Bureau of Prisons, to author (Jan. 30, 2018) (on file with the
author) [hereinafter 2018 FOIA Materials] (providing FOIA-responsive material). Throughout this
piece, the term “immigration offense” refers to a set of federal crimes related to citizenship status:
smuggling or harboring undocumented noncitizens in violation of 8 U.S.C. §§ 1322–1324 (2012);
unlawful entry or reentry in violation of 8 U.S.C. §§ 1325–1326; and document offenses such as
using a fraudulent passport and misuse of a U.S. visa, which are prohibited by 18 U.S.C. § 1546
(2012).
8 2018 FOIA Materials, supra note 7 (listing 18,941 people in all-foreign prisons in January
2018).
9 As of September 2018, there are 181,302 people in federal prison. See Inmate Citizenship,
FED. BUREAU PRISONS (Sept. 29, 2018), https://www.bop.gov/about/statistics/statistics_inmate_
citizenship.jsp [https://perma.cc/3TG8-9HR4]. BOP has identified 146,118 of those prisoners as
U.S. citizens; 26,337 as noncitizens from Mexico, Cuba, Colombia, or the Dominican Republic; and
8847 as prisoners with “other/unknown” citizenship status. Id. If “other/unknown” prisoners are
noncitizens, foreign nationals make up just under 20% of the total prison population and 53% of
the noncitizens in federal prison live in segregated prisons. See infra notes 161–163 and accompanying text (discussing these figures in more detail).
10 As of January 30, 2018, 68% of prisoners in all-foreign facilities are citizens of Mexico. See
2018 FOIA Materials, supra note 7.
11 Eighty-nine percent of prisoners in all-foreign facilities were born in Mexico, Cuba, the
Dominican Republic, Central America, or South America. See id.
12 See infra p. 1388 (providing a comprehensive list of sources).
13 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2012 & Supp. 2016).
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down institutions with fewer services than other federal prisons.14 This
is no accident. Under current prison regulations, which emerged alongside the all-foreign prison in the 1990s, noncitizens are exempt from education requirements; excluded from drug treatment and job training
programs; and ineligible for placement in minimum-security prisons,
transfer close to their homes, and early release.15 Together, these policies
have turned noncitizens into a distinct class of prisoners and encouraged
prison officials to funnel foreign nationals into remote prisons with fewer
resources.
At first glance, a system of separate and unequal prisons for foreigners, almost all of whom are people of color, seems like a straightforward
violation of equal protection law. This is, after all, state-sponsored segregation of a suspect class.16 Noncitizens are a classic “discrete and
insular minority” — unrepresented in the political process and long subject to prejudice and restrictive legislation.17 The Supreme Court has
held, moreover, that the practice of segregating prisons by race or ethnicity deserves strict scrutiny.18 It would be easy to add alienage to this
list.
But all-foreign prisons sit at the intersection of two powerful lines of
deference, which warp traditional equality doctrines. First, in cases involving alienage, courts defer to federal policies that distinguish citizens
from foreign nationals on the theory that the federal government has
expansive authority to regulate immigration.19 This rule, known as the
plenary power doctrine, entitles all-foreign prisons to deference as federal
institutions. Second, in cases involving prisons, courts routinely defer
to penal policies that restrict prisoners’ rights, including the right to
equal protection, on the ground that prisons are difficult institutions to
run.20 This rule, which I call the penal power doctrine, entitles allforeign prisons to deference because they are prisons.
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
14 See infra p. 1409 (noting that all-foreign prisons have higher rates of solitary confinement,
more deaths in custody, and fewer programs than integrated federal prisons).
15 See infra pp. 1400-01.
16 See Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 372 (1971) (quoting United States v. Carolene Prods.
Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938)); see also Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 369 (1886) (holding
that the Fourteenth Amendment applies to foreign nationals “within the territorial jurisdiction” of
the United States).
17 See infra pp. 1427–28. For a classic debate over the value of the Carolene Products framework, see Bruce A. Ackerman, Beyond Carolene Products, 98 HARV. L. REV. 713 (1985); and Daniel
A. Farber & Philip P. Frickey, Is Carolene Products Dead? Reflections on Affirmative Action and
the Dynamics of Civil Rights Legislation, 79 CALIF. L. REV. 685 (1991). See also David A. Strauss,
Is Carolene Products Obsolete?, 2010 U. ILL. L. REV. 1251 (2010).
18 See Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 499, 511–12 (2005).
19 See infra pp. 1426–31 (discussing debates on the meaning and scope of the plenary power
doctrine).
20 See infra pp. 1424–26.
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Scholars have critiqued these doctrines21 but have rarely considered
how they interact. This is a significant omission in a legal system that
polices migration through its prisons. In practice, two discrete deference
regimes — one from immigration law, the other prison law — combine
to give federal prison officials broad latitude to determine how and
where noncitizens can be punished.
The model of punishment they have chosen has concerning consequences. To highlight one, isolating foreign nationals introduces widespread ethnic segregation into the federal prison system. The prisoners
in all-foreign facilities are overwhelmingly and disproportionately
Latino.22 In recent years, prison officials have described the all-foreign
prison population as “very homogenous”23 and “primarily Mexican.”24
The Bureau of Prisons’ internal data show that Latino noncitizens are
significantly more likely than non-Latino noncitizens to be held in segregated prisons.25 And, as this Article uncovers, the Bureau referred to
the precursor to the all-foreign prison — a set of specialized intake and
release prisons for noncitizens — as facilities “targeted at the Mexican
citizens.”26 These statements raise the specter of profiling27 and aggravate the concern that American prison policy serves to identify and manage disfavored groups.28
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
21 See, e.g., Cox & Rodríguez, supra note 2 (discussing the plenary power doctrine); Sharon
Dolovich, Forms of Deference in Prison Law, 24 FED. SENT’G REP. 245 (2012) (critiquing deference
regimes in prison law).
22 See infra pp. 1414–17.
23 Letter from Patricia McNair Persante, Exec. Vice President, Contract Compliance, GEO
Group, to Office of Inspector Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice 2 (Aug. 9, 2016) (on file with the Harvard
Law School Library).
24 Letter from Ryan Wynne, Contracting Officer, Fed. Bureau of Prisons, to All Interested Parties 1 (Mar. 10, 2010) (on file with the Harvard Law School Library).
25 See infra pp. 1414–17 (noting that 89% of the noncitizens in all-foreign prisons are Latino, as
compared to 58% of the noncitizens in integrated federal prisons).
26 Institutional Hearing Program: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Immigration and Claims of
the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong. 91 (1997) [hereinafter Hearing Before Subcomm. on
Immigration] (statement of John L. Clark, Assistant Director, Community Corrections and Detention, Federal Bureau of Prisons).
27 As explained infra pp. 1416–17, the overrepresentation of Latino noncitizens in all-foreign
prisons is suggestive but inconclusive evidence that BOP is funneling Latino prisoners into segregated facilities. It would take additional data to conclude that, controlling for all relevant factors,
ethnicity determines the likelihood that a particular noncitizen will be sent to a segregated prison.
BOP declined to provide that data. See Letter from Ian Guy, Supervising Attorney, Fed. Bureau
of Prisons (June 12, 2018) (on file with the Harvard Law School Library).
28 See Monica C. Bell, Police Reform and the Dismantling of Legal Estrangement, 126 YALE
L.J. 2054, 2061 (2017) (“[The] other, more insidious function [of the American criminal justice
system] is the management and control of disfavored groups such as African Americans, Latin
Americans, the poor, certain immigrant groups, and groups who exist at the intersection of those
identities.”). Section II.C, infra pp. 1414–18, explores the relationship between race, ethnicity, citizenship status, and national origin in all-foreign prisons.
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All-foreign prisons also raise a basic question about the scope of the
federal immigration power. Prison officials describe these prisons as a
way to support federal immigration authorities,29 and these institutions
developed from a decade-long effort to integrate the Bureau of Prisons
with what was then called the Immigration and Naturalization Service
(INS) and is now Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE).30 But
there is little evidence that all-foreign prisons facilitate deportation and
good reason to insist that these prisons are not sites of migration control.
The latter point is the critical one. Under current equal protection
doctrine, courts defer to any federal policy characterized as migration
control, no matter who crafted it or how little it relates to the government’s ability to regulate national borders.31 Courts draw no distinctions between the many federal actors that make alienage policy. This
means, for example, that prison wardens, civil servants, park rangers,
officials in the Department of Health and Human Services, Congress,
and the President can all lay claim to the federal immigration power,
and to the deference that comes with it.
This is a crude way to allocate an extraordinary constitutional power.
Governing alienage jurisprudence ignores the deep puzzle of immigration law: noncitizens are at once unequal and entitled to equal protection, even when the federal government acts. To make sense of that
puzzle, courts need a better theory of migration control, one that distinguishes punishment from immigration regulation and limits when federal actors can invoke the immigration power to justify their policies.
To that end, this Article defends a simple idea: only core immigration
activities — setting rules on entry, exit, and naturalization — should
count as migration control. Other species of state action, including segregating foreign-national prisoners, may affect where and how immigrants live their lives. But they are not migration control, at least insofar
as the Constitution is concerned.
The Article advances this argument in four Parts. Part I describes
how the all-foreign prison transformed from a pilot project into a web
of separate prisons for noncitizens. Part II catalogues the consequences
of this new prison system. Part III explores the constitutional framework that governs all-foreign prisons. Part IV contends that this framework is misguided and explains why all-foreign prisons cannot be justified as an instance of migration control.
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
29
30

See infra pp. 1406–07.
See infra section I.B, pp. 1394–401. The Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107296, 116 Stat. 2135 (codified as amended in scattered sections of the U.S. Code), eliminated INS
and established three divisions — ICE, Customs and Border Protection (CBP), and U.S. Citizenship
and Immigration Services (USCIS) — within the new Department of Homeland Security. Id.
31 See infra pp. 1426–31.
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In mapping this terrain, this Article makes several contributions.
Perhaps most important, it presents the only data of its kind on noncitizen prisoners — a largely hidden population — and provides the first
comprehensive account of the prison’s role in immigration enforcement.
Penal institutions are often overlooked in immigration scholarship,
which tends to emphasize cooperation between ICE agents and police.32
Yet prisons were the primary site of enforcement when the pace of deportations began to rise in the 1980s.33 Three decades later, prisonbased enforcement initiatives account for nearly half of all “immigrant
apprehensions,” more than most other immigration-enforcement programs
combined.34 This Article aims to shift focus to the post-conviction criminal justice system, where prisons are a critical part of America’s deportation regime.
In doing so, this Article brings citizenship to the foreground of debates about punishment. Scholars have long documented the relationship between prisons and both racial and economic inequality. Academics have described mass imprisonment as “the New Jim Crow,”35 as a
means to “warehouse” people of color,36 and as a way to punish the
poor.37 Criminal law scholars have written less about citizenship.38 To
be sure, all-foreign prisons are only one small piece of mass incarceration. But over the last twenty years, prison officials have turned alienage into an organizing principle for the federal prison system. This development deserves attention as scholars consider what prisons are for.
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
32 Professor César Cuauhtémoc García Hernández’s work on “immigration prisons” is one notable exception. See, e.g., César Cuauhtémoc García Hernández, Abolishing Immigration Prisons,
97 B.U. L. REV. 245 (2017); César Cuauhtémoc García Hernández, Creating Crimmigration, 2013
B.Y.U. L. REV. 1457. Hernández argues that imprisoning noncitizens for immigration crimes is
part of a broader shift toward using incarceration to effectuate immigration policy. See Hernández,
Creating Crimmigration, supra, at 1458. To emphasize this trend, Hernández describes both civil
detention centers and prisons that hold individuals convicted of federal immigration crimes as “immigration prisons.” Hernández, Abolishing Immigration Prisons, supra, at 248 n.8. This Article is
narrower and broader: it focuses on only criminal prisons, but examines all noncitizens convicted
of crimes, not just those convicted of immigration offenses. See supra note 7 (defining “immigration
offense”).
33 See infra pp. 1395–97.
34 See AM. IMMIGRATION COUNCIL, THE CRIMINAL ALIEN PROGRAM (CAP) 6 (2013) (noting that the Criminal Alien Program, an initiative that sends immigration agents into prisons and
jails, is “responsible for the largest number of immigrant apprehensions . . . . more than the 287(g)
program, Fugitive Operations, and the Office of Field Operations combined”).
35 MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE AGE
OF COLORBLINDNESS (2010); see also James Forman, Jr., Racial Critiques of Mass Incarceration:
Beyond the New Jim Crow, 87 N.Y.U. L. REV. 21, 25–27 (2012).
36 JONATHAN SIMON, GOVERNING THROUGH CRIME: HOW THE WAR ON CRIME
TRANSFORMED AMERICAN DEMOCRACY AND CREATED A CULTURE OF FEAR 142 (2007).
37 LOÏC WACQUANT, PUNISHING THE POOR: THE NEOLIBERAL GOVERNMENT OF
SOCIAL INSECURITY, at xi–xxiii (2009).
38 For some notable exceptions, see sources cited supra notes 3 and 32.
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Finally, this Article advances an ongoing debate about executive authority to make immigration law. For decades, legal scholarship on immigration focused on federalism: on whether states can regulate migration; when federal priorities preempt state immigration laws; and
whether preemption claims better protect immigrants’ rights than challenges arising from equal protection law.39 With the emergence and
rescission of high-profile programs like Deferred Action for Childhood
Arrivals (DACA), this conversation has begun to shift to the federal
level, and in particular to questions about the distribution of immigration power between the President and Congress.40 This Article embraces that shift and offers a critical assessment of immigration enforcement within the executive branch. In an era of administrative
governance, the most pressing questions about citizenship concern how
agencies interact, what authority they possess, and when the Constitution
limits the federal government’s power to discriminate against noncitizens.
I. THE RISE OF THE ALL-FOREIGN PRISON
Although federal prisons classified by alienage are new, using prisons
to identify foreigners is not. Prison guards started to record federal prisoners’ nationalities in the mid-nineteenth century and to coordinate with
immigration agents as early as 1904. It was not until the 1990s, however,
that prison officials began to build a separate system of federal prisons
for noncitizens. This Part tells the story of how these unusual institutions emerged. It begins with a brisk history of the prison’s role in immigration enforcement before 1980. It then describes a roughly twentyyear period between 1980 and 2000 during which interactions between
prison and immigration officials grew increasingly formal and routine,
and norms around the use of penal institutions began to erode. This
process led to the first all-foreign prison and, ultimately, to a new model
of punishment I call segregation by citizenship.
A brief word on methods before I begin. This Part mines a range of
archival sources, including congressional records, BOP records, census
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
39 See, e.g., Lucas Guttentag, Immigration Preemption and the Limits of State Power: Reflections on Arizona v. United States, 9 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 1, 3 (2013); Clare Huntington, The Constitutional Dimension of Immigration Federalism, 61 VAND. L. REV. 787, 792–95 (2008); Harold
Hongju Koh, Equality with a Human Face: Justice Blackmun and the Equal Protection of Aliens,
8 HAMLINE L. REV. 51, 52–56 (1985); Cristina M. Rodríguez, The Significance of the Local in
Immigration Regulation, 106 MICH. L. REV. 567, 567–68 (2008); Michael J. Wishnie, Laboratories
of Bigotry? Devolution of the Immigration Power, Equal Protection, and Federalism, 76 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 493, 504–05 (2001).
40 See, e.g., Cox & Rodríguez, supra note 2, at 458; Adam B. Cox & Cristina M. Rodríguez, The
President and Immigration Law Redux, 125 YALE L.J. 104, 104 (2015); Catherine Y. Kim, Plenary
Power in the Modern Administrative State, 96 N.C. L. REV. 77, 77 (2017); see also Kristin A. Collins,
Bureaucracy as the Border: Administrative Law and the Citizen Family, 66 DUKE L.J. 1727 (2017)
(examining how “lower-level agency deliberation,” id. at 1730, has shaped immigration law).

1388

HARVARD LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 132:1379

reports, and newspaper articles, from the Founding to the present. It
draws on traditional legal sources such as statutes, federal regulations,
judicial opinions, and filings in litigation involving all-foreign prisons,
and on less familiar materials such as prison policies, procurement records, and the contracts for nine all-foreign prisons, all of which are run
by private prison companies.41 This Part also relies on data obtained
through FOIA — specifically, BOP’s internal statistics on the citizenship
status, country of origin, age, gender, crime of conviction, sentencing
jurisdiction, and sentence length for all prisoners in segregated federal
prisons. Finally, it builds from background interviews with criminal
defenders and immigration attorneys who work near the Texas-Mexico
border and have represented clients in all-foreign prisons.42
Together, these sources reveal two bureaucracies that developed in
tandem from their origins in the early 1900s until their integration in
the 1980s. The rise of the all-foreign prison is in many respects a story
about the birth and growth of the administrative state. It is also a story
about how the criminalization of immigration has changed federal prisons. In the pages that follow, I portray a prison system that has transformed from a site of corrections, in which the implicit aim was to reform prisoners and return them to the polity, into an institution
dedicated to finding and sorting foreigners.43
A. 1850–1980: Building a Bureaucracy
Government officials began to document federal prisoners’ nationalities in the 1850s.44 At the time, there were no federal prisons; all federal
prisoners were held in state prisons, which received fees for each federal
inmate they agreed to board.45 As the number of federal prisoners grew,
the Secretary of the Treasury began to poll U.S. marshals for information about prisoners in their custody, and the federal government undertook a systematic effort to count prisoners for the census.46 The 1850
Census, which was collected during a period of rapid immigration from

–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
41 As noted above, this Article relies on internal statistics obtained from BOP through a FOIA
request. It also draws on the contracts for nine all-foreign prisons, which BOP disclosed to Stephen
Raher and which he shared with me. See Raher v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, No. 09-CV-00526, 2011
WL 4832574, at *1 (D. Or. Oct. 12, 2011).
42 I also attempted to interview prisoners in all-foreign facilities, but BOP prohibited it. See
infra note 191.
43 See infra pp. 1393–94.
44 See REPORT OF THE SUPERINTENDENT OF THE CENSUS FOR DECEMBER 1, 1852, at
13–14, 29 (1853) [hereinafter SEVENTH CENSUS]; see also PAUL W. KEVE, PRISONS AND THE
AMERICAN CONSCIENCE: A HISTORY OF U.S. FEDERAL CORRECTIONS 13 (1991).
45 KEVE, supra note 44, at 1, 13.
46 Id. at 13.
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Europe and China,47 was the first to include the prison population.48 It
divided prisoners only between the “native” and the “foreign born,” noting that “time ha[d] not sufficed to admit of . . . more particular separation.”49 Over the next several decades, official tallies of the prison population became more granular and began to include detailed information
on “[t]he foreign born element.”50
This national effort to document the prison population coincided
with the birth of federal immigration law. For the first century of
American history, immigration was regulated by states.51 With the exception of the Alien Friends Law of 1798,52 a short-lived statute that
authorized the President to deport any noncitizen “dangerous to the
peace and safety of the United States,”53 there were no federal laws restricting immigration or authorizing deportation before the end of the
Civil War.54 That changed when Congress passed the first federal immigration statute — a law intended to bar the entry of Chinese
women — in 1875.55 Sixteen years later, as immigration from southern
and eastern Europe increased, Congress enacted the first federal deportation law, which authorized removal of people “likely to become a public charge” and those convicted of felonies or crimes of “moral turpitude”
before entering the United States.56
The federal government then began to build an immigration control
apparatus. In 1891, a year before Ellis Island opened, Congress created
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
47 HIROSHI MOTOMURA, AMERICANS IN WAITING: THE LOST STORY OF IMMIGRATION
AND CITIZENSHIP IN THE UNITED STATES 15–19 (2006).
48 See SEVENTH CENSUS, supra note 44, at 29.
49 Id.
50 BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, DEP’T OF COMMERCE & LABOR, SPECIAL REPORTS:

PRISONERS AND JUVENILE DELINQUENTS IN INSTITUTIONS 1904, at 19 (1907).
51 Gerald L. Neuman, The Lost Century of American Immigration Law (1776–1875), 93
COLUM. L. REV. 1833, 1841–44 (1993); see also Kerry Abrams, The Hidden Dimension of NineteenthCentury Immigration Law, 62 VAND. L. REV. 1353, 1357 (2009).
52 Act of June 25, 1798, ch. 58, 1 Stat. 570.
53 Id. § 1. The Alien Friends Law, one of the controversial Alien and Sedition Acts, lasted only
two years. See id. § 6. The statute empowered the President to order “dangerous” noncitizens to
leave the country, authorized three years’ imprisonment and deportation of anyone who refused,
id., and in an early reference to the prison’s role in enforcing federal immigration law, permitted
the President to order the removal of “any alien who may or shall be in prison,” id. § 2.
54 See LUCY E. SALYER, LAWS HARSH AS TIGERS: CHINESE IMMIGRANTS AND THE
SHAPING OF MODERN IMMIGRATION LAW 3 (1995). As Professor Hiroshi Motomura has noted,
federal laws regulating the movement of “free blacks and slaves” can also be understood as early
immigration laws. HIROSHI MOTOMURA, IMMIGRATION OUTSIDE THE LAW 65 (2014).
55 Page Act of 1875, ch. 141, 18 Stat. 477 (repealed 1974). The Page Act, which banned the entry
of prostitutes, “specifically target[ed] Chinese women.” Kerry Abrams, Polygamy, Prostitution, and
the Federalization of Immigration Law, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 641, 643 (2005). It also banned immigration of anyone convicted of a felony whose “sentence ha[d] been remitted on condition of their
emigration” and authorized the deportation of “such obnoxious persons” after a hearing. § 5, 18
Stat. at 477.
56 1891 Immigration Act, ch. 551, § 1, 26 Stat. 1084, 1084.

1390

HARVARD LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 132:1379

the office of the Superintendent of Immigration, the first federal immigration enforcement agency.57 Congress authorized the purchase of land
for the first federal prisons the same year.58 Both projects grew quickly
in scope and ambition. By the early 1900s, there were three federal prisons,59 and the newly created Bureau of Immigration and Naturalization
had started to “canvass . . . all penal institutions in the United States for
the purpose of discovering the number of alien prisoners detained
therein.”60
The early twentieth century was a period of intense anxiety about
foreign criminals.61 In 1907, for the first time in American history,
Congress made deportation a collateral consequence of criminal conviction when it authorized the expulsion of “any alien woman or girl” identified as a prostitute within three years of entry.62 This was a pivotal
shift in American immigration law.63 Although immigration statutes
had long targeted people with criminal records from their home countries, it was not until February 1907 that crimes committed after entry
into the United States could trigger removal. The same month,
Congress formed the Dillingham Commission, an expansive national
study of immigration into the United States.64 The Commission’s report
contained a lengthy examination of “alien criminality”65 and recommended that Congress amend immigration laws to make noncitizens deportable for any serious crime committed within five years of entry.66
States, too, began to take a keen interest in their foreign prisoner
populations. As Congress debated “[h]ow to rid the country of the alien
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
57 See id. § 7; see also SALYER, supra note 54, at 32 (describing networks of customs collectors
who enforced immigration laws at the nation’s ports in the late nineteenth century).
58 See Act of Mar. 3, 1891, ch. 529, 26 Stat. 839.
59 KEVE, supra note 44, at 37–50.
60 36 U.S. IMMIGRATION COMM’N, IMMIGRATION AND CRIME, S. Doc. No. 61-750, at 179
(3d Sess. 1910) [hereinafter DILLINGHAM COMMISSION]; see also Act of Mar. 2, 1895, ch. 177, § 1,
28 Stat. 764, 780 (establishing the Bureau of Immigration under the Secretary of the Treasury); Act
of Mar. 4, 1913, ch. 141, § 3, 37 Stat. 736, 737 (transferring the Bureau of Immigration to the new
Department of Commerce and consolidating several “offices, bureaus, divisions, and branches” under its jurisdiction).
61 JOHN HIGHAM, STRANGERS IN THE LAND: PATTERNS OF AMERICAN NATIVISM 1865–
1925, at 160 (2002).
62 See Act of Feb. 20, 1907, ch. 1134, § 3, 34 Stat. 898, 900 (repealed 1917).
63 See DANIEL KANSTROOM, DEPORTATION NATION: OUTSIDERS IN AMERICAN
HISTORY 133 (2007).
64 S. REP. NO. 81-1515, at 1 (1950) (noting that the Dillingham Commission’s investigation
lasted four years, “cost a little over $800,000 and necessitated the employment of over 200 persons”
across the United States). See generally KATHERINE BENTON-COHEN, INVENTING THE
IMMIGRATION PROBLEM: THE DILLINGHAM COMMISSION AND ITS LEGACY (2018).
65 DILLINGHAM COMMISSION, supra note 60, at 179.
66 Criminal Aliens, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 18. 1910, at 12 (“Chairman Dillingham’s Commission on
Immigration would have the three-year limit extended to five years, as if that would help matters
any.”).
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criminal class,”67 prison officials in New York, a state that received
many of the country’s new immigrants, undertook a months-long “census of the prison population” and lobbied the Governor to commute
prisoners’ sentences so they could “be deported en masse.”68 Though it
does not appear to have been adopted, the idea of segregating foreign
prisoners surfaced in this period. In 1910, New York’s prison superintendent proposed that noncitizens “be segregated and treated as a class”
in prisons built and run by the federal government.69 This is perhaps
the first reference to an all-foreign prison in the United States.
The national debate over deportation and crime culminated in the
1917 Immigration Act,70 which established “[t]he essential pieces of the
modern [deportation] regime.”71 That statute dramatically expanded
the range of crimes that could lead to deportation, permitted deportation
based on a single crime for five years after entry, and made immigrants
deportable for life if they were convicted of more than one offense.72 It
also appropriated federal funds to enforce immigration laws for the first
time.73 Despite the rise of federal laws directed at foreign criminals
between 1875 and 1917, actual deportations remained rare — with annual numbers in the hundreds or low thousands — until the 1920s, when
deportation rates increased more than tenfold.74 The 1917 Immigration
Act inaugurated this enforcement shift, in part by tying eligibility for
deportation to outcomes in criminal courts.
To find and remove foreign criminals, however, the state needed a
bureaucracy. The 1920s was a period of swift change in immigration
law: in a span of five years, Congress criminalized illegal entry75 and
established a national quota system, ending the longstanding policy of

–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
67
68

Deportable Criminals, WASH. POST, June 18, 1909, at 6.
May Send Back Convicts, N.Y. DAILY TRIB., June 14, 1909, at 3; see also Deport Criminal
Aliens, WASH. POST, Mar. 3, 1909, at 10.
69 Foreign Criminals Crowd Our Prisons, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 24, 1910, at 6.
70 Act of Feb. 5, 1917, ch. 29, 39 Stat. 874 (repealed 1952).
71 KANSTROOM, supra note 63, at 133.
72 Id. at 133–34 (listing these and other changes in the statute); see also S. REP. NO. 81-1515, at
54 (1950) (describing the 1917 Act as a “radical change[]” in immigration law).
73 Mae M. Ngai, The Strange Career of the Illegal Alien: Immigration Restriction and Deportation Policy in the United States, 1921–1965, 21 LAW & HIST. REV. 69, 74 (2003). Until the 1920s,
border control was funded largely through head taxes on arriving immigrants. KELLY LYTLE
HERNÁNDEZ, MIGRA!: A HISTORY OF THE U.S. BORDER PATROL 26, 32–33 (2010).
74 See KANSTROOM, supra note 63, at 158 (noting that deportations increased from 2762 in
1920 to 38,796 in 1929); see also MAE M. NGAI, IMPOSSIBLE SUBJECTS: ILLEGAL ALIENS AND
THE MAKING OF MODERN AMERICA 67 (2004) (tying these numbers to increased enforcement
along the United States-Mexico border).
75 Act of Mar. 4, 1929, ch. 690, § 2, 45 Stat. 1551, 1551 (repealed 1952) (making unlawful entry
a misdemeanor punishable by one year in prison and a $1000 fine); id. § 1(a) (making unlawful
reentry after deportation a felony punishable by two years’ imprisonment and a $1000 fine).
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“open immigration from Europe.”76 This was also a decade of expansion
and professionalization for law enforcement. In 1924, Congress created
and funded the first professional border patrol, a cadre of 450 immigration agents in the Department of Labor.77 Two years later, the Census
Bureau began to keep annual records of the federal prison population,78
and the newly minted Bureau of Efficiency urged Congress to build more
federal prisons.79 By 1933, Congress had created the Federal Bureau of
Prisons to oversee America’s federal prisons80 and President Roosevelt
had consolidated disparate sections of the Department of Labor into the
Immigration and Naturalization Service.81
The operations of these two agencies were not yet integrated — immigration enforcement remained piecemeal and largely focused on the
country’s geographic borders82 — but as the pace of deportations increased, immigration agents turned to federal and state prison officials
to find potential deportees. In 1931, the Chicago District Director of
Immigration credited “increased cooperation from the Chicago police
department and the state prison officials” with enabling a record number of deportations from the region.83 Four years later, in what the Los
Angeles Times called an “alien crime purge,” President Roosevelt commuted the sentences of 151 federal prisoners to allow for their deportation from the United States.84
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
76 Ngai, supra note 73, at 74–75. The 1924 Immigration Act capped immigration at 150,000
people a year. Id. at 75. To put this limit in perspective, immigration before World War I averaged
approximately one million people each year. Id. The quota system lasted until the Immigration
and Nationality Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-236, 79 Stat. 911 (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 8 U.S.C.).
77 H.R. Con. Res. 122, 106th Cong. (1999). For a history of border patrol before this period, see
HERNÁNDEZ, supra note 73, at 17–32.
78 BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, HISTORICAL STATISTICS ON
PRISONERS IN STATE AND FEDERAL INSTITUTIONS, YEAREND 1925–1986, at i (1989).
79 KEVE, supra note 44, at 92–93.
80 Act of May 14, 1930, ch. 274, 46 Stat. 325.
81 Exec. Order 6166 § 14 (June 10, 1933).
82 NAT’L COMM’N ON LAW OBSERVANCE & ENF’T, REPORT ON THE ENFORCEMENT OF
THE PROHIBITION LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES 34 (1931); Ngai, supra note 73, at 78, 82–84;
see also KELLY LYTLE HERNÁNDEZ, CITY OF INMATES: CONQUEST, REBELLION, AND THE
RISE OF HUMAN CAGING IN LOS ANGELES, 1771–1965, at 144 (2017) (describing “a string of
federal jails dedicated to imprisoning immigration offenders, namely Mexicans” outside Los Angeles
in the 1930s).
83 Alien Criminals, Editorial, CHI. DAILY TRIB., Jan. 5, 1931, at 14; see also Criminal Alien
Bureau Lists 309 for Deporting, N.Y. HERALD TRIB., July 12, 1931, at 8 (noting that New York’s
new “Police Bureau of Criminal Alien Investigation” had identified “criminal aliens” in jails and
penal institutions and “delivered [them] to the immigration authorities at Ellis Island”); cf. John L.
Coontz, Get Out! Says Uncle Sam to Criminal Aliens, WASH. POST, Apr. 30, 1933, at SM1 (“With
a gesture of his mighty arm and a broom that sweeps the Nation, Uncle Sam is cleaning house of
the alien criminal.”).
84 Alien Crime Purge Begun, L.A. TIMES, July 27, 1935, at 1; see also President, for Economy,
Frees 151 Aliens from Federal Prisons for Deportation, N.Y. TIMES, July 27, 1935, at 1. President
Roosevelt had to commute prisoners’ sentences because, with limited exceptions, noncitizens could
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Public records of cooperation between INS and prison officials recede in the 1940s and 50s. Facing a shortage of workers during World
War II, the federal government invented the Bracero Program, a plan
to admit temporary guest laborers from Mexico that would last twentytwo years and bring millions of migrants into the United States.85 In
the mid-1940s, immigration enforcement shifted toward regulation of
these migrant “guest workers”86 and toward the arrest and detention of
Japanese, German, and Italian noncitizens.87 Though many immigrants
were detained and deported during this period — and conditions in immigration detention facilities were often brutal — prisons were not yet
permanent detention sites.88 Indeed, holding detainees in prisons was
controversial. When Ellis Island closed in the early 1950s, INS attempted to transfer all immigration detainees into federal prisons, but
rescinded its plan when politicians and prison officials objected.89 The
distinction between imprisonment and detention loomed large in debates over where to house Ellis Island’s inhabitants. In 1954, Jacob
Javits, then a New York representative to Congress, “protested the use
of prisons” on the ground that detaining noncitizens in penal institutions
was “disruptive . . . of our social concept of the purposes of a prison.”90
There are two ways to understand this objection. As Javits argued
to the press, housing detainees in prisons scrambled the distinction between criminal and civil incarceration, casting all immigrants as criminals.91 Confining detainees in prisons also violated prevailing norms
around the use of penal institutions. The mid-twentieth century was
the height of the rehabilitative ideal, a theory of punishment in which
prisons serve to reform criminals through individualized, therapeutic

–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
not be deported until they completed their prison terms. This “imprisonment-before-deportation
rule” remains in effect today. See infra note 183.
85 HERNÁNDEZ, supra note 73, at 101; Cox & Rodríguez, supra note 2, at 485–90. The Bracero
Program ended in 1964. HERNÁNDEZ, supra note 73, at 101.
86 KANSTROOM, supra note 63, at 221; Ingrid V. Eagly, Prosecuting Immigration, 104 NW. L.
REV. 1281, 1352 (2010) (noting that 1950s immigration prosecutions focused on so-called “wet-back”
cases in which “the federal government charged thousands of laborers, gave them little or no jail
time, and sent them home”).
87 KANSTROOM, supra note 63, at 207.
88 See Jonathan Simon, Refugees in a Carceral Age: The Rebirth of Immigration Prisons in the
United States, 10 PUB. CULTURE 577, 578–79 (1998).
89 Joseph J. Ryan, Detained Aliens Lodged in Hotel as U.S. Ends Housing Them in Jail, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 10, 1954, at 1. Angel Island Immigration Station, Ellis Island’s West Coast analogue,
closed in 1940. See History of Angel Island Immigration Station, ANGEL ISLAND IMMIGR.
STATION FOUND., https://www.aiisf.org/history/ [https://perma.cc/29YN-KLB9].
90 Ryan, supra note 89.
91 Id. (“[Javits] asked if aliens were some kind of ‘second-class human beings not entitled to the
normal amenities of a civilized social order.’”).
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treatment.92 This conception of punishment presumed prisoners’ eventual release and reintegration into the United States.93 Holding detainees — a class of people not yet admitted into the polity, who might ultimately be expelled — in prisons undermined this vision of “corrections”
and conflicted with dominant assumptions about the relationship between prisons and American society.
Thus, well into the twentieth century, prisons remained separate
from immigration detention centers and only indirectly involved in border control. This was the status quo until 1980, when the relationship
between imprisonment and immigration regulation took a turn.
B. 1980–1999: Turf Battles
If one had to pick a date when the integration of INS and BOP
began, it would be April 1980.94 That month, the Mariel boatlift
brought more than 100,000 Cuban immigrants to the shores of southern
Florida.95 In response to mass emigration from Cuba and rising numbers of Haitian immigrants fleeing the Jean-Claude Duvalier regime into
the United States,96 INS built Krome Avenue Detention Center, the first
federal immigration detention facility since Ellis Island.97 Krome soon
crept into prisons. After several high-profile riots and escapes at the
detention center, and reports that a number of Mariel refugees had been
released from Cuban prisons, BOP requested funds for “a separate [federal] prison for illegal alien felons,”98 and the government began to move
“Mariel Cubans” into federal and state prisons and local jails.99
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
92 See CHARLES BRIGHT, THE POWERS THAT PUNISH: PRISON AND POLITICS IN THE
ERA OF THE “BIG HOUSE,” 1920–1955, at 306–07 (1996); Edgardo Rotman, The Failure of Reform:
United States, 1865–1965, in THE OXFORD HISTORY OF THE PRISON: THE PRACTICE OF
PUNISHMENT IN WESTERN SOCIETY 169, 169 (Norval Morris & David J. Rothman eds., 1995).
I do not mean to endorse the rehabilitative ideal, nor to suggest that it was ever in fact achieved,
but rather to highlight the conflict between a model of punishment in which prisoners are presumed
reformable and one in which they are presumed deportable.
93 BRIGHT, supra note 92, at 307 (“[T]he implied destination of those banished from society for
a term of imprisonment was always release and re-inclusion. The proofs of rehabilitation that were
required for parole . . . were all marks of normalization, signs that once criminally deviant souls
could be returned to the folds of society . . . .”).
94 For an argument that the federal government’s attitude toward immigrants began to shift in
the 1970s during the Nixon Administration, see Cybelle Fox, Unauthorized Welfare: The Origins of
Immigrant Status Restrictions in American Social Policy, 102 J. AM. HIST. 1051, 1053 (2016).
95 See Palma v. Verdeyen, 676 F.2d 100, 101 (4th Cir. 1982) (describing the Mariel boatlift).
96 Cox & Rodríguez, supra note 2, at 492–93 (noting that, in 1980 alone, 24,530 Haitians fled
“Baby Doc” Duvalier’s Haiti for the United States, id. at 493).
97 See Simon, supra note 88, at 579. I am referring here to long-term, permanent detention
centers. For a history of detention in jails and short-term border patrol facilities along the U.S.Mexican border before 1980, see generally HERNÁNDEZ, supra note 73.
98 William E. Gibson, Senate OKs $7.1 Million for an Alien Felon Prison, SUN SENTINEL,
Nov. 2, 1985, at 3A.
99 Criminals at Krome Make Camp a Prison for Refugees, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Nov. 29, 1985,
at C1 (“There are nearly 3000 Mariel Cubans in federal lockups, [and] another 2500 in state and
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The Mariel boatlift marked the beginning of a significant change in
the criminal justice system. In the early 1980s, as mandatory minimum
sentences and harsh drug laws started to drive dramatic increases in
prison populations100 and politicians decried an influx of “undesirable”
immigrants,101 criminal justice agencies began to formalize their relationship with INS. Local sheriffs and state prosecutors in New York
and California reached out to the federal government to “request[] closer
coordination” with immigration authorities102 and some state prison officials started to submit lists of self-identified foreign-born prisoners to
immigration agents.103 INS responded by shifting its focus to prisons.
By 1985, INS had concluded that “the most efficient way to address the
criminal alien problem [was] to work within the prison system,” where
potential deportees were easy to find.104 For the immigration agency,
prisons offered a ready solution to a new and growing social problem.
Prisons, in turn, began to look less like the reformatories Jacob Javits
imagined and more like one of many interchangeable tools for immigration enforcement.
Congress encouraged this development with the passage of two laws,
the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986105 (IRCA) and the
Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988.106 IRCA, which introduced employer
sanctions into immigration law, also included a brief provision requiring
the Attorney General to “begin any deportation proceeding as expeditiously as possible” after a noncitizen is convicted of a deportable offense.107 In response to this mandate, INS created two programs,108
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
local jails.”); Krome’s Mariels, Other Inmates, Staff Seek Relief, SUN SENTINEL, Nov. 28, 1985, at
23B (noting that Cuban refugees at Krome would “be transferred to a federal prison”); see also 8
Cubans from Mariel Boat Lift Are Released from Minnesota Prisons, STAR TRIB., May 19, 1988,
at 48.
100 See THE SENTENCING PROJECT, TRENDS IN U.S. CORRECTIONS: 1925–2015, at 1–3
(2017).
101 See KANSTROOM, supra note 63, at 227.
102 U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/GGD-86-58BR, CRIMINAL ALIENS: INS’
INVESTIGATIVE EFFORTS IN THE NEW YORK CITY AREA 15 (1986) [hereinafter GAO,
D’AMATO REPORT] (describing coordination between INS and the New York County District
Attorney’s office); see also George Ramos, INS Opens Drive to Deport Alien Inmates of U.S. Jails,
L.A. TIMES, July 31, 1986, at SD1 (recounting the Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Office’s effort to
coordinate with INS).
103 See, e.g., GAO, D’AMATO REPORT, supra note 102, at 11.
104 Id. at 10.
105 Pub. L. No. 99-603, 100 Stat. 3359 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.).
106 Pub. L. No. 100-690, § 7341, 102 Stat. 4181, 4469 (codified as amended in scattered sections
of the U.S. Code).
107 § 701, 100 Stat. at 3445.
108 MARC R. ROSENBLUM & WILLIAM A. KANDEL, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42057,
INTERIOR IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT: PROGRAMS TARGETING CRIMINAL ALIENS 12
(2012).
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which continue today: the Institutional Hearing Program (IHP), a “coordinated effort” in which immigration judges adjudicate deportation
proceedings inside prisons,109 and the Alien Criminal Apprehension
Program (ACAP), an initiative in which teams of immigration agents
enter prisons and jails to find potential deportees.110 These programs
built immigration enforcement — contact with INS agents and actual
immigration courts — into the prison system. Both began as small pilot
projects111 and existed alongside other ad hoc measures to identify incarcerated noncitizens eligible for deportation.112
IRCA was soon followed by the Anti-Drug Abuse Act, a signature
piece of President Reagan’s “war against crime.”113 Although it is rarely
viewed as an immigration law, the Anti-Drug Abuse Act had lasting
effects on noncitizens in the United States. Most notably, it created “aggravated felonies,” a set of criminal offenses that render noncitizens presumptively deportable.114 The initial list of aggravated felonies was
short,115 but the creation of this category of offenses established noncitizens convicted of crimes as an especially easy group of people to deport.
The Anti-Drug Abuse Act also prioritized prison-based immigration enforcement by requiring the Attorney General to hold removal proceedings in “correctional facilities” and to “assure[] expeditious deportation . . . following the end of the alien’s incarceration for the underlying
sentence.”116 Shortly after the law’s passage, INS reported to Congress
that it had directed its resources toward prisons rather than trying to
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
109 FED. BUREAU OF PRISONS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, PROGRAM STATEMENT 5111.04, at
1 (2006).
110 See ROSENBLUM & KANDEL, supra note 108, at 12. These two programs were consolidated
into the Criminal Alien Program in 2006. AM. IMMIGRATION COUNCIL, supra note 34, at 2; see
also U.S. IMMIGRATION & CUSTOMS ENF’T, FACT SHEET: CRIMINAL ALIEN PROGRAM (2008),
https://www.ice.gov/doclib/news/library/factsheets/pdf/cap.pdf [https://perma.cc/2B4F-9MDB].
111 See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/GGD-88-3, CRIMINAL ALIENS: INS’
ENFORCEMENT ACTIVITIES 30 (1987) (noting that ACAP would be “piloted in . . . Chicago,
Los Angeles, Miami, and New York” until INS received additional funding); U.S. GEN.
ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/GGD-90-79, CRIMINAL ALIENS: PRISON DEPORTATION
HEARINGS INCLUDE OPPORTUNITIES TO CONTEST DEPORTATION 5 (1990) (describing the
early Institutional Hearing Program).
112 See, e.g., INS v. Nat’l Immigration & Naturalization Serv. Council, No. ARBIHS07207, 1990
WL 1107403, at *2 (July 23, 1990) (Keisler, Arb.) (noting that INS has “temporarily detailed” immigration officers to thirty-day “tour[s] of duty” in federal prisons); Patrick McDonnell, INS Effort to
Include Interviews with Inmates, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 1, 1986, at 1 (“INS agents seeking aliens who
could be deported will attempt to interview each foreign-born person among the 125,000 suspects
booked annually in jails in San Diego . . . .”).
113 Gerhard Peters & John T. Woolley, Ronald Reagan: Radio Address to the Nation on Crime
and Criminal Justice Reform, AM. PRESIDENCY PROJECT (Sept. 11, 1982), http://www.presidency.
ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=42952 [https://perma.cc/3JN9-Q79W].
114 Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690, §§ 7342, 7347, 102 Stat. 4181, 4469, 4471–72.
115 The first aggravated felonies were murder, drug trafficking, and firearms trafficking. Id.
§ 7342.
116 Id. § 7347.
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find “aliens when they initially come into contact with the criminal justice system.”117 The prison was thus the central enforcement site as the
convergence of criminal and immigration law — a phenomenon now
known as “crimmigration” and most often associated with the police —
began to unfold.118
INS’s integration into prison systems deepened in the 1990s. In two
laws passed in 1996 — the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty
Act119 (AEDPA) and the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant
Responsibility Act120 (IIRIRA) — Congress vastly expanded the list of
aggravated felonies and other criminal convictions that give rise to deportation121 and made it more difficult for noncitizens convicted of
crimes, including long-term permanent residents, to appeal deportation
orders.122 Congress also funded a broad effort to identify incarcerated
noncitizens, first by conditioning federal funding on each state’s promise
to inform INS when a noncitizen is convicted under state law,123 then
by doubling INS’s enforcement budget124 and creating a “criminal alien
tracking center” within the immigration agency.125 States with large
immigrant populations (and the most expensive prison systems) engaged
in a parallel identification project. In the mid-nineties, Departments of
Correction in Florida, New York, and California developed computer
systems to track “suspected or confirmed” noncitizens in prisons126 and
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
117 Criminal Aliens: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Immigration, Refugees, and Int’l Law of
the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 101st Cong. 55 (1989) (statement of Lowell Dodge, Director, Administrator of Justice Issues, General Government Division, U.S. General Accounting Office).
118 Professor Juliet Stumpf coined the term “crimmigration” in 2006. See Juliet Stumpf, The
Crimmigration Crisis: Immigrants, Crime, and Sovereign Power, 56 AM. U. L. REV. 367 (2006).
119 Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996) (codified as amended in scattered sections of the
U.S. Code).
120 Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009-546 (1996) (codified as amended in scattered sections of
8, 18, and 28 U.S.C.).
121 In April 1996, AEDPA made more than ten new crimes “aggravated felonies.” § 440(e), 110
Stat. at 1277–78. Six months later, IIRIRA expanded the term “aggravated felony” and amended
existing immigration laws to subject noncitizens convicted of firearm offenses and almost all drug
offenses to deportation. See Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 321, 110 Stat. 3009-627 to -628. As a result,
conviction for any misdemeanor or felony controlled substance offense other than a single conviction for simple possession of thirty grams or less of marijuana renders a noncitizen eligible for
deportation. See 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i) (2012). For a full list of aggravated felonies, see 8 U.S.C.
§ 1101(a)(43). Note that, after IIRIRA, immigration statutes refer to both deportation and exclusion
at the border as “removal.”
122 AEDPA precludes relief from removal for noncitizens convicted of aggravated felonies, controlled substance violations, firearms offenses, and other crimes. See § 440(a), 110 Stat. at 1276–77.
123 See Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-649, § 507, 104 Stat. 4978, 5050–51.
124 Hearing Before Subcomm. on Immigration, supra note 26, at 2 (statement of Rep. Lamar
Smith).
125 Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, § 130002, 108
Stat. 1796, 2023.
126 See Hearing Before Subcomm. on Immigration, supra note 26, at 62 (statement of Kelly
Tucker, Correctional Services Administrator, Florida Department of Corrections) (noting that the
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the Texas Department of Criminal Justice used “inmate labor” to build
an INS facility “on prison grounds.”127
Although the effort to find and deport imprisoned noncitizens picked
up considerable steam in the nineties, it would be a mistake to portray
this process as seamless. INS’s push into prison systems was met with
resistance, particularly from prison officials in states that bore the cost
of imprisoning noncitizens. Between 1992 and 1994, six states —
Arizona, California, Florida, New Jersey, New York, and Texas — sued
INS, seeking reimbursement for confining “alien” prisoners.128 These
suits were ultimately dismissed,129 but they prompted the federal government to expand the Institutional Hearing Program130 and to fund the
State Criminal Alien Assistance Program (SCAAP), a scheme under
which states receive federal money if they report the numbers of noncitizens they imprison.131 These promises prompted further disputes: in
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
Florida prison system counts “suspected or confirmed aliens” in its custody); see also id. at 60 (statement of Joe Sandoval, Secretary, California Youth and Adult Correctional Agency) (describing
California’s “criminal alien flagging project”); id. at 73–75 (statement of Anthony J. Annucci, Deputy Comm’r and Counsel, New York State Department of Correctional Services) (stating that New
York counted all “alien inmates,” id. at 74, and had recently “provided the INS with limited access
to its on-line computer database,” id. at 73).
127 Id. at 80 (statement of Catherine C. McVey, Assistant Director, Programs and Services Division,
Texas Department of Criminal Justice).
128 Arizona v. United States, 104 F.3d 1095, 1096 (9th Cir. 1997) (Arizona); California v. United
States, 104 F.3d 1086, 1089 (9th Cir. 1997) (California); Texas v. United States, 106 F.3d 661, 664
(5th Cir. 1997) (Texas); Padavan v. United States, 82 F.3d 23, 25–26 (2d Cir. 1996) (New York); New
Jersey v. United States, 91 F.3d 463, 465 (3d Cir. 1996) (New Jersey); Chiles v. United States, 69 F.3d
1094, 1096 (11th Cir. 1995) (Florida).
129 States brought these suits under a variety of provisions, including 8 U.S.C. § 1365 (2012)
(authorizing the Attorney General to reimburse states for imprisoning “any illegal alien or Cuban
national who is convicted of a felony”); 8 U.S.C. § 1229(d) (requiring the Attorney General to begin
deportation “as expeditiously as possible after the date of the conviction”); the Guarantee Clause;
and the Tenth Amendment. All were dismissed as nonjusticiable or for failure to state a claim,
rulings appellate courts affirmed. See sources cited supra note 128. These early suits over immigration policy are often overlooked in debates about states’ power to depart from federal immigration priorities and the federal government’s take care duties under Article II, Section 3. See,
e.g., Texas v. United States, 809 F.3d 134, 146 n.3 (5th Cir. 2015) (declining to decide whether the
Deferred Action for Parents of Americans (DAPA) program violated the Take Care Clause), aff’d by
an equally divided Court, 136 S. Ct. 2271 (2016) (mem.) (per curiam).
130 See Hearing Before Subcomm. on Immigration, supra note 26, at 73 (statement of Anthony J.
Annucci, Deputy Comm’r and Counsel, New York State Department of Correctional Services) (“[I]n
the early 1990s, the department had commenced a lawsuit against the Federal Government . . . .
[A]s a means of resolving the lawsuit to the mutual satisfaction of both sides, [Attorney General
Janet Reno offered] to enhance the IHP in New York . . . .”); see also id. at 13 (statement of Norman
J. Rabkin, Director, Administration of Justice Issues, U.S. General Accounting Office) (“Since 1994,
INS has focused its efforts on improving IHP operations in BOP and in seven states — Arizona,
California, Florida, Illinois, New Jersey, New York, and Texas . . . .”).
131 Congress created SCAAP in 1986, then funded and expanded it in 1994. See IRCA, Pub. L.
No. 99-603, § 501, 100 Stat. 3359, 3443 (1986) (directing the Attorney General to reimburse states
“for the costs incurred . . . for the imprisonment of any illegal alien or Cuban national” convicted
of a felony); Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, § 20301,
108 Stat. 1796, 1823–24 (expanding federal reimbursement); see also Ann Morse, The State Criminal
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1997, the New York State Department of Corrections held a monthlong “shutdown” of prison-based immigration courts, arguing that the
Department of Justice had not paid money due under SCAAP.132
States also objected to federal pressure to reorganize their prison systems. If the battle over foreign national prisoners was about the costs
of federal immigration policy, it was also about institutional authority.
As INS began to expand into penal institutions in the mid-1990s, the
Agency urged states to “consolidate the foreign-born population” into
fewer prisons.133 Texas obliged, merging “[m]ultiple intake, hearing, and
release sites for foreign-born inmates . . . into [a] single site” with permanent INS staff.134 States with different immigration politics, however, refused to incorporate border control into prison management.135
Florida argued that transferring all noncitizens into one prison presented security concerns.136 New York agreed to process most of the
“foreign-born inmate population” at two intake sites, but declined to
“make a further commitment” until it “s[aw] the productivity that was
promised” by INS.137 California objected that housing “inmates who
contest deportation” together “represent[ed] an additional work load” for
prison officials and “compromise[d] [the state’s] inmate classification
and management policies.”138
INS had fewer “[t]urf battles”139 with BOP, which proved a more
willing partner in the integration of prison and immigration policy. In
1996, the two agencies signed an agreement creating eleven intake sites
for noncitizens known as “enhanced IHP” prisons.140 These prisons,
which were modeled on a “joint [BOP]-INS contract facility” opened in
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
Alien Assistance Program (SCAAP), NAT’L CONF. STATE LEGISLATURES (Apr. 13, 2013), http://
www.ncsl.org/research/immigration/state-criminal-alien-assistance-program.aspx [https://perma.cc/
9S6J-GQSJ] (“Originally authorized by [IRCA], the program was not funded until the Violent Crime
Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994 . . . .”).
132 See Hearing Before Subcomm. on Immigration, supra note 26, at 6 (statement of Rep. Lamar
Smith).
133 Id. at 32 (statement of Paul Virtue, Executive Associate Comm’r, Programs, U.S. Immigration
and Naturalization Service); see also id. at 13 (statement of Norman J. Rabkin, Director, Administration of Justice Issues, U.S. General Accounting Office) (noting that “INS had wanted” states to
“consolidate their IHP sites” and to “reduce the number of release sites” for noncitizen prisoners).
134 Id. at 36 (statement of Paul Virtue, Executive Associate Comm’r, Programs, U.S. Immigration
and Naturalization Service).
135 See id. at 13 (statement of Norman J. Rabkin, Director, Administration of Justice Issues, U.S.
General Accounting Office).
136 Id.
137 Id. at 93 (statement of Anthony J. Annucci, Deputy Comm’r and Counsel, New York State
Department of Correctional Services).
138 Id. at 57 (statement of Joe Sandoval, Secretary, California Youth and Adult Correctional
Agency).
139 Id. at 6 (statement of Rep. Lamar Smith).
140 Id. at 54 (statement of John L. Clark, Assistant Director, Community Corrections and Detention,
Federal Bureau of Prisons).
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Arizona in 1994, boasted built-in immigration courtrooms and permanent “office space for INS.”141 Initially, BOP sent noncitizens to these
prisons for immigration hearings at the start of their sentences, then
transferred them to other prisons “to free up beds.”142 In 1997, one of
BOP’s Assistant Directors described IHP prisons as facilities “targeted
at the Mexican citizens.”143
BOP’s willingness to work with INS coincided with an increase in
the number of noncitizens in federal prisons. Federal prosecutions for
immigration crimes began to rise in the late 1990s, as immigration policy
took a punitive turn and the penalties for immigration violations grew
increasingly harsh.144 Between 1986 and 1996, Congress passed at least
six laws expanding sanctions for immigration crimes, including the maximum prison sentence for illegal reentry.145 As a result, the foreign national population in federal prisons ballooned, from just over 7000 in
1989 to more than 20,000 by 1994.146 In the face of this shift in the
prison population, and growing political pressure to coordinate with
INS,147 BOP built migration control into its intake and release processes.
The Agency also began to see noncitizens as a set of prisoners who
would be deported at the end of their prison terms and thus ought not
receive services aimed at reforming prisoners before their release. Between 1988 and 2000, BOP made noncitizens ineligible for drug treatment programs148 and, in most instances, for “nearer release” transfers,
which place prisoners closer to their families;149 exempted foreign nationals from literacy and math requirements that trigger access to basic
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
141 Id. at 55; see also FED. BUREAU OF PRISONS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 109,
attachment A (listing IHP sites).
142 Hearing Before Subcomm. on Immigration, supra note 26, at 55 (statement of John L. Clark,
Assistant Director, Community Corrections and Detention, Federal Bureau of Prisons).
143 Id. at 91 (statement of John L. Clark, Assistant Director, Community Corrections and Detention,
Federal Bureau of Prisons).
144 David Alan Sklansky, Crime, Immigration, and Ad Hoc Instrumentalism, 15 NEW CRIM. L.
REV. 157, 165–67 (2012). Prosecutions for other crimes remained “far more constant.” Id. at 167;
see also Eagly, supra note 86, at 1353 fig. 4 (charting the immigration caseload between 1923 and
2009).
145 Sklansky, supra note 144, at 165.
146 Pierre Thomas, One Out of Four Federal Prisoners Not a U.S. Citizen, WASH. POST, Nov.
25, 1994, at A1 (citing BOP statistics); see also U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, 2011 REPORT TO
THE CONGRESS: MANDATORY MINIMUM PENALTIES IN THE FEDERAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE
SYSTEM, ch. 4, at 79–80 (2011) (tracing the federal prison population between 1995 and 2010).
147 See Hearing Before Subcomm. on Immigration, supra note 26, at 8 (statement of Norman J.
Rabkin, Director, Administration of Justice Issues, U.S. General Accounting Office) (describing
INS’s effort to induce prison officials to “make the processing of aliens more efficient”).
148 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-12-320, BUREAU OF PRISONS:
ELIGIBILITY AND CAPACITY IMPACT USE OF FLEXIBILITIES TO REDUCE INMATES’ TIME
IN PRISON 32 (2012) (“Prior to a 1996 BOP policy change, inmates with detainers could complete
the [drug treatment] program . . . .”).
149 FED. BUREAU OF PRISONS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, PROGRAM STATEMENT 5100.07, ch.
10, at 4 (1999). Many of these restrictions apply to “inmates with detainers.” See, e.g., id.; U.S.
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education programs;150 and proposed a rule excluding noncitizens from
all postsecondary and occupational education programs before concluding that foreign nationals could participate in such programs, but only
if “resources are available after participation by inmates” without detainers.151 BOP also “categorically excluded” deportable noncitizens
from early release following successful completion of a drug treatment
program152 and clarified that noncitizens were ineligible for placement
in halfway houses.153
In short, in a flurry of policies during the 1990s, BOP limited noncitizens’ access to a range of rehabilitative programs. These policies
marked the culmination of a decade-long effort to incorporate immigration enforcement into prison management and to single out noncitizens
as a separate — and less deserving — class of federal prisoners. Once
the Bureau had identified this exceptional population, it revived an idea
from the early twentieth century: prisons segregated by citizenship status.
C. 1999–2018: Segregated Prisons
The Bureau of Prisons created all-foreign prisons in 1999. In April
of that year, the Agency announced that it was considering “housing
[the] criminal alien population in [private] low-security” prisons154 called
“Criminal Alien Requirement” — or CAR — facilities.155 The Bureau
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 148, at 30–32. Given that nearly all noncitizen
prisoners are subject to immigration detainers, detainer restrictions effectively exclude noncitizens
from these programs. See Press Release, Office of Pub. Affairs, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Pursuant to
Executive Order on Public Safety, Department of Justice Releases Data on Incarcerated Aliens
(May 2, 2017), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/pursuant-executive-order-public-safety-departmentjustice-releases-data-incarcerated-aliens-0 [https://perma.cc/87SA-8EB9] (noting that, as of March
2017, 99.9% of the noncitizens in BOP custody were either under ICE investigation for possible
removal, subject to a final removal order, or charged but not yet ordered deported); see also LENA
GRABER & AMY SCHNITZER, NAT’ L IMMIGRATION PROJECT, THE BAIL REFORM ACT AND
RELEASE FROM CRIMINAL AND IMMIGRATION CUSTODY FOR FEDERAL CRIMINAL
DEFENDANTS 3 (2013) (“In practice, ICE routinely issues an immigration detainer . . . almost immediately upon learning of a noncitizen’s placement in criminal custody.”).
150 See Control, Custody, Care, Treatment and Instruction of Inmates; Minimum Standards for
Administration, Interpretation, and Use of Education Tests, 53 Fed. Reg. 10,202 (Mar. 29, 1988)
(codified at 28 C.F.R. § 544.11(a)(3)) (making testing requirements inapplicable to “[s]entenced aliens
with a deportation detainer”).
151 Occupational Education Programs, 68 Fed. Reg. 65,169, 65,169 (Nov. 19, 2003) (codified at
28 C.F.R. 544) (finalizing a rule proposed on July 17, 2000).
152 See United States v. Lopez-Salas, 266 F.3d 842, 848 (8th Cir. 2001).
153 See United States v. Restrepo, 999 F.2d 640, 642–43 (2d Cir. 1993).
154 Notice of Intent to Prepare a Draft Environmental Impact Statement (DEIS) for Housing
Criminal Alien Population in Non-Federal Low-Security Correctional Facilities, 64 Fed. Reg.
20,021, 20,021 (proposed Apr. 23, 1999).
155 OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, AUDIT OF THE FEDERAL
BUREAU OF PRISONS CONTRACT NO. DJB1PC007 AWARDED TO REEVES COUNTY, TEXAS
TO OPERATE THE REEVES COUNTY DETENTION CENTER I/II PECOS, TEXAS 2 (2015) [hereinafter OIG, REEVES AUDIT].
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then began to solicit bids from companies interested in operating prisons
for noncitizens.156 In June 1999, Corrections Corporation of America
won the first contract and started to construct CAR prisons in California
City, California, and Milan, New Mexico.157 BOP planned to fill these
facilities with noncitizens transferred from federal prisons in Arizona,
California, New Mexico, Oklahoma, and Texas.158
Twenty years later, this model of incarceration is entrenched in the
federal prison system. There are now ten CAR prisons, all of which are
low-security institutions159 run by for-profit corporations.160 CAR prisons are located in seven states: California, Georgia, Mississippi, North
Carolina, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, and Texas.

–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
156
157

See id.
Judith Greene, Bailing Out Private Jails, AM. PROSPECT, Sept. 10, 2001, at 23, 27. Corrections Corporation of America rebranded as CoreCivic in October 2016. Dave Boucher, CCA
Changes Name to CoreCivic amid Ongoing Scrutiny, TENNESSEAN (Oct. 28, 2016, 11:22 AM),
http://tnne.ws/2eDwkI5 [https://perma.cc/2KZE-FR79].
158 Greene, supra note 157, at 27.
159 BOP’s inmate classification system has five security levels: minimum, low, medium, high, and
administrative. FED. BUREAU OF PRISONS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, PROGRAM STATEMENT
5100.08, ch. 1, at 1 (2006). Administrative prisons are “institution[s] with a special mission” such as
“medical/mental health.” Id. ch. 2, at 1.
160 As of January 2018, the CAR facilities were: Adams County Correctional Center in Natchez,
Mississippi; Big Spring Correctional Center in Big Spring, Texas; D. Ray James Correctional Facility in Folkston, Georgia; Giles W. Dalby Correctional Facility in Post, Texas; Great Plains Correctional Facility in Hinton, Oklahoma; McRae Correctional Facility in Helena, Georgia; Moshannon
Valley Correctional Center in Philipsburg, Pennsylvania; Reeves County Detention Center III in
Pecos, Texas; Rivers Correctional Institution in Winton, North Carolina; and Taft Correctional
Institution in Taft, California. 2018 FOIA Materials, supra note 7. Three corporations — CoreCivic,
GEO Group, and Management and Training Corporation — operate all CAR prisons.
See Contract Prisons, FED. BUREAU PRISONS, https://www.bop.gov/about/facilities/contract_
facilities.jsp [https://perma.cc/7WG3-66LV].
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Figure 1: All-Foreign Prison Locations

Together they hold 18,941 people,161 which is approximately 10% of
the total federal prison population162 and 53% of the noncitizen prisoner
population.163 Most foreigners in federal prison thus live in institutions
segregated by alienage.
These numbers are slightly lower than they were several years ago.
After BOP and INS invented them in 1999, “criminal alien” prisons expanded at a steady clip164 until 2015, when the Obama Administration

–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
161
162

2018 FOIA Materials, supra note 7.
As of September 2018, the total federal prison population was 181,302. See Inmate Citizenship, supra note 9.
163 See supra note 9. Two caveats concerning BOP statistics are necessary. First, BOP’s public
data on citizenship divide prisoners into only six categories: citizens of (1) the United States; (2)
Mexico; (3) Cuba; (4) Colombia; (5) the Dominican Republic; and (6) prisoners whose citizenship
status is “other/unknown.” Inmate Citizenship, supra note 9. The claim that 53% of noncitizens
live in segregated prisons assumes that prisoners whose citizenship status is “other/unknown” are
noncitizens. It is possible that some of these prisoners are U.S. citizens, but that number is unlikely
to be very large given that BOP currently imprisons nationals from at least 131 total countries,
including thousands of prisoners from countries other than Mexico, Cuba, Colombia, and the
Dominican Republic. See 2018 FOIA Materials, supra note 7. Second, prison statistics suffer from
inherent limitations: it is not clear how BOP collects citizenship data, and prison populations change
daily no matter how accurate statistics are.
164 See OIG, REEVES AUDIT, supra note 155, at 3 tbl.2 (listing fourteen CAR prisons with a total
population of 26,801 in February 2015); see also E. ANN CARSON & WILLIAM J. SABOL, BUREAU
OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, PRISONERS IN 2011, at 13 (2012) (noting that
18% of the federal prison population was in private facilities in 2011).
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terminated the contracts for two prisons.165 Two more closures followed,166 and all CAR prisons seemed poised to shut their doors after
the Obama Justice Department announced that it would no longer use
private prisons.167 The Trump Administration, however, reversed this
policy and began to solicit bids for new all-foreign prisons in May 2017.168
The prisoners in all-foreign facilities are serving time for a range of
criminal offenses. According to BOP’s internal statistics, 53% of CAR
prisoners were convicted of a drug crime, 32% committed an immigration offense, and 8% were sentenced for a violent offense.169 These figures are consistent with the broader federal prison population, in which
47% of noncitizens are serving a sentence for a drug-related crime, 43%
are serving time for an immigration offense, and 10% have been sentenced for some other criminal offense.170
CAR prisoners hail from a wide range of countries — 131 in total.171 The vast majority, however, are from a small set of countries.
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
165 Willacy County Correctional Center in Raymondsville, Texas, and Northeast Ohio Correctional Center in Youngstown, Ohio, closed in 2015. See John Burnett, Closure of Private Prison
Forces Texas County to Plug Financial Gap, NPR (Mar. 26, 2015, 3:49 AM), https://www.npr.org/
2015/03/26/394918220/closure-of-private-prison-forces-texas-county-to-plug-financial-gap [https://
perma.cc/5BR5-GU5D]; Stephen Koff, Federal Prison in Youngstown Might Not Feel Effects of
Private-Prison Phase-Out, CLEVELAND.COM (Aug. 19, 2016, 1:08 PM), https://www.cleveland.
com/metro/index.ssf/2016/08/federal_prison_in_youngstown_u.html [https://perma.cc/H3ZF-7AQT].
166 In 2016, BOP declined to renew its contracts with Corrections Corporation of America for
Cibola County Correctional Center in Milan, New Mexico, and Eden Detention Center in Eden,
Texas. See Dan Boyd, Cibola County Prison Closing Will Impact 300 Workers, ALBUQUERQUE J.
(Aug. 3, 2016, 10:33 PM), https://www.abqjournal.com/819694/closure-of-cibola-county-prisoncould-affect-300-employees.html [https://perma.cc/TJQ9-WTCT]; Michael Marks, After Eden’s
Prison Closes, What’s Next for This Small Texas Town?, TEX. STANDARD (May 5, 2017, 10:27 AM),
https://www.texasstandard.org/stories/after-edens-prison-closes-what-comes-next-for-this-smalltexas-town/ [https://perma.cc/2B8J-URB9].
167 Sally Q. Yates, Phasing Out Our Use of Private Prisons, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE ARCHIVES
(Aug. 18, 2016), https://www.justice.gov/archives/opa/blog/phasing-out-our-use-private-prisons
[https://perma.cc/S6RT-RVX9].
168 Fed. Bureau of Prisons, supra note 6.
169 See 2018 FOIA Materials, supra note 7. The figure for “immigration offenses” includes offenses BOP lists under the category “immigration” (6171 of 18,941 prisoners), but not convictions
for “fraud/bribery/extortion” (885) or “counterfeit/embezzlement” (23). See id.; see also supra note
7 (defining “immigration offense”). The term “violent offense” includes convictions for crimes involving weapons or explosives (599), homicide and aggravated assault (137), burglary or larceny
(453), sex offenses (310), and robbery (60), but not convictions for national security offenses (7) or
involvement in a continuing criminal enterprise (7). See 2018 FOIA Materials, supra note 7.
170 MARK MOTIVANS, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE,
IMMIGRATION OFFENDERS IN THE FEDERAL JUSTICE SYSTEM, 2010, at 35 (2013).
171 2018 FOIA Materials, supra note 7. In addition, BOP data show that 725 prisoners in CAR
facilities are U.S. citizens sentenced in Arizona, California, or Washington, D.C. Id. All but three
of those prisoners are in Rivers or Taft Correctional Institution. Id.; see also OFFICE OF
INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, REVIEW OF THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF PRISONS’
MONITORING OF CONTRACT PRISONS 9 n.21 (2016) [hereinafter OIG, REVIEW OF CONTRACT
PRISONS]. It is unclear why there are U.S. citizens in these two “criminal alien requirement” pris-
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Those born in Colombia, Cuba, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El
Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, or Mexico constitute 87% of the allforeign prison population.172 Close to 70% were born in Mexico.173
Figure 2: Noncitizen Prisoners’ Nationalities

The Bureau of Prisons sends prisoners from all over the United
States to CAR facilities. All-foreign prisons hold people sentenced in
every one of the country’s ninety-four district courts, including those in
the Virgin Islands, the Northern Mariana Islands, Puerto Rico, and
Guam.174 Again, though, a handful of jurisdictions drive this prison
system. More than half of all CAR prisoners were sentenced in one of

–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
ons, and their presence raises questions about when an institution is actually “segregated.” I describe CAR prisons as segregated by alienage because they were built specifically to imprison foreigners, are described in BOP contracts as prisons for “non-U.S. citizens with deportation orders,”
and house only a small number of U.S. citizens. See infra pp. 1406–07 and sources cited infra note
178. Note that the U.S. citizen population is omitted from Figure 2.
172 See 2018 FOIA Materials, supra note 7. These are statistics on prisoners’ place of birth, not
citizenship status. This figure (87%) remains the same using citizenship data.
173 See id. (listing 12,944 prisoners born in Mexico of 18,929 prisoners with recorded birthplaces).
Prisoners born in the Dominican Republic — the second-largest group — constitute only 4% of the
population. Id. (listing 697 prisoners born in the Dominican Republic). Again, place of birth and
citizenship are different, although they often align. For instance, there are only 12,921 Mexican
citizens and 695 citizens of the Dominican Republic in all-foreign prisons. Id. Section II.C discusses
the slippage between these concepts, infra pp. 1414–18.
174 2018 FOIA Materials, supra note 7. CAR prisons also hold one prisoner sentenced by the
U.S. Army and 273 prisoners sentenced in District of Columbia Superior Court. Id.

1406

HARVARD LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 132:1379

six courts along the southern border.175 No other jurisdiction comes
close to the numbers delivered by these few.176
Figure 3: Sentencing Jurisdictions for CAR Prisoners

To the extent that BOP offers a public rationale for all-foreign prisons, the Agency describes segregated penal institutions as a way to facilitate border control. In early environmental impact statements, for
instance, the Bureau presented all-foreign prisons as part of an effort to
“support[] . . . the Immigration and Naturalization Service in the rapidly
increasing requirements for the detention of . . . aliens awaiting hearings
and/or release or repatriation to their countries of origin.”177 Procurement documents reiterate this cooperation rationale and emphasize that
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
175 See id. As of January 2018, the most represented sentencing jurisdictions in CAR prisons
were the Southern District of Texas (3230 of 18,768 prisoners for whom BOP had sentencing data),
the District of Arizona (2148), the Western District of Texas (1721), the Southern District of California
(1107), the Southern District of Florida (980), and the Middle District of Florida (875). Id. Prisoners
from these six jurisdictions constitute 54% of the CAR prison population. See id.
176 See id. The only other jurisdictions to send more than 300 prisoners to CAR facilities were
the Northern District of Texas (521), the Central District of California (419), the District of New
Mexico (371), the Southern District of New York (364), the Eastern District of California (348), and
the Eastern District of Texas (328). See id. Most (58%) jurisdictions sent fewer than 100 prisoners
to CAR facilities. See id.
177 Notice of Intent to Prepare a Draft Environmental Impact Statement (DEIS) for Housing
Criminal Alien Population in Non-Federal Low-Security Correctional Facilities, 64 Fed. Reg.
20,021, 20,021–22 (proposed Apr. 23, 1999); see also Notice of Availability of the Finding of No
Significant Impact, 79 Fed. Reg. 57,978, 57,979 (Sept. 26, 2014); Notice of Cancellation of the Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement for Housing the Criminal Alien Population in NonFederal Low-Security Correctional Facilities, 65 Fed. Reg. 30,622 (May 12, 2000). Note, however,
that the U.S. government almost never repatriates foreign-national prisoners. Emma Kaufman,
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all-foreign prisons are supposed to house sentenced “non-U.S. citizens
with deportation orders.”178 But the history of these facilities suggests
a less systematic, more path-dependent story. All-foreign prisons appear
to have been born of convenience, the logical outgrowth of a new approach to foreigners in which prison services became a privilege of
citizenship.
There is, moreover, little evidence that segregating foreign nationals
makes it meaningfully easier to identify noncitizens convicted of crimes.
Prisoners sent to all-foreign prisons will already have been identified by
immigration authorities through Secure Communities, a program in
which law enforcement agencies share data with ICE,179 or the Criminal
Alien Program (CAP), an extensive screening initiative that grew out of
the cooperative enforcement programs created in the late 1980s.180 Under CAP, ICE now sends teams of immigration agents from 171 field
offices into “more than 4300 federal, state, and local jails” and claims to
check the immigration status of all “self-proclaimed foreign-born nationals . . . within [BOP] facilities.”181 BOP also provides lists of all
“foreign-born inmates in its custody” to ICE on “a daily basis.”182 Immigration authorities are thus likely to know that a prisoner is eligible
for removal well before he arrives in an all-foreign prison.
Nor is there much evidence that these prisons facilitate deportation.
With limited exceptions, noncitizens must serve their full criminal sentences before being deported.183 Although it could, in theory, streamline
the removal process to concentrate noncitizens in specific prisons at the
end of their sentences and to deport them directly from those penal institutions, BOP does not appear to use all-foreign prisons this way.
These are long-term prisons, in which the average sentence is six
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
Extraterritorial Punishment, 20 NEW CRIM. L. REV. 66, 80 (2017) (stating that the Department of
Justice denied 97% of repatriation applications between 2005 and 2010).
178 See, e.g., Fed. Bureau of Prisons, RFP-PCC-0022, Performance Work Statement 3 (June 26,
2013) (on file with the Harvard Law School Library); see also Fed. Bureau of Prisons, RFP-PCC0025, Solicitation, Offer, and Award (Apr. 18, 2017) (on file with the Harvard Law School Library).
In some environmental impact statements, BOP also describes CAR prisons as a response to prison
overcrowding, but it is unclear how segregating prisoners reduces the prison population. See, e.g.,
Notice of Intent to Prepare a Draft Environmental Impact Statement, 76 Fed. Reg. 3925, 3925 (Jan.
21, 2011).
179 See Cox & Miles, supra note 3, at 93.
180 See AM. IMMIGRATION COUNCIL, supra note 34, at 1–2. CAP developed from ACAP and
IHP, the cooperative enforcement programs created in response to IRCA. See supra pp. 1395–96.
181 AM. IMMIGRATION COUNCIL, supra note 34, at 5.
182 Press Release, Office of Pub. Affairs, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, supra note 149.
183 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(4) (2012); see also Peter H. Schuck, Immigrant Criminals in Overcrowded
Prisons: Rethinking an Anachronistic Policy, 27 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 597, 636–41 (2013) (discussing
the “imprisonment-before-deportation rule,” which Congress created in 1917, id. at 636). AEDPA
reaffirmed this rule in 1996 and created a narrow exception in cases where the Attorney General
deems it “appropriate” to permit early release of a noncitizen convicted of a nonviolent offense other
than an immigration offense or certain aggravated felonies. Schuck, supra, at 640–41.
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years.184 Close to a quarter of all CAR prisoners are serving ten years
or more185 and three are serving life terms.186 Some prisoners, moreover,
are citizens of countries to which deportation is unlikely, including
Cambodia, Guinea, Sierra Leone, and Syria.187 When prisoners can be
deported, BOP instructs prison officials to transfer noncitizens “close
to the eventual area of deportation”188 as their removal dates near and
lists both all-foreign and integrated prisons as noncitizen “release
sites.”189 In interviews, immigration attorneys reported that most CAR
prisoners are sent to immigration detention centers at the end of their
prison sentences.
None of these accounts indicates that CAR prisons are last-stop institutions in a coordinated deportation regime. Instead, all-foreign prisons represent a new model of prison management — less a means to
facilitate deportation than an emergent penology in which noncitizens
are punished differently than citizens of the United States.
II. THE CONSEQUENCES OF SEGREGATION
Segregating prisons by alienage has consequences, both for prisoners
and for the prison system as a whole. Some are concrete: for example,
prisoners in all-foreign facilities live in harsh conditions with higher
rates of prison violence and reduced access to family and counsel. This
new prison system also has a more abstract — though no less important — impact on the dynamics of race and ethnicity behind bars.
This Part examines the practical effects of segregation by citizenship.
First, though, it is critical to underscore just how little we know about
all-foreign prisons. These are remarkably closed institutions, even by
prison standards. There are few public reports on CAR facilities and
almost all the information that exists resulted from years of FOIA litigation.190 My own effort to understand these prisons has involved cold
calls to prisons, interviews, forays into federal court dockets, three FOIA
requests, and an eight-month effort to obtain approval to write letters
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
184 See 2018 FOIA Materials, supra note 7. Note that this figure excludes three prisoners with
life sentences (which would make the average higher) and 173 prisoners for whom sentence data is
“missing.” Id.
185 Id. (listing 4375 prisoners (23%) with sentences of 120 months or more).
186 Id.
187 See id.; see also Ron Nixon, Trump Administration Punishes Countries That Refuse to Take
Back Deported Citizens, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 13, 2017), https://nyti.ms/2y07s3s [https://perma.cc/
QPG5-GR8V] (listing countries that refuse to accept the return of their nationals); Vivian Yee, 6900
Syrians Win Permission to Stay in the U.S., for Now, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 31, 2018), https://nyti.ms/
2Fyh6OR [https://perma.cc/2E2G-W8B9].
188 FED. BUREAU OF PRISONS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 109, at 10.
189 Id. attachment A.
190 See supra note 41; infra note 191.
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to prisoners, which ultimately failed.191 Even if BOP permits communication, moreover, no all-foreign prison offers access to TRULINCS,
an email system that exists in all other federal prisons.192 Nonetheless,
it is possible to get a glimpse of life inside an all-foreign prison. The
picture that emerges is bleak.
A. Conditions of Confinement
The three best sources on conditions in all-foreign prisons are a fouryear study by the DOJ Inspector General;193 articles by an investigative
journalist who obtained 9000 pages of BOP medical records after a
FOIA suit;194 and a report by the ACLU National Prison Project, which
conducted twelve site visits and 270 interviews at CAR prisons in 2013
and 2014.195 Each describes all-foreign prisons as institutions with unusually poor healthcare; overcrowding; higher rates of solitary confinement, lockdowns, and deaths in custody than comparable BOP institutions; and a dearth of rehabilitative programs such as drug treatment
and education courses, which are offered in other federal prisons.196 An
immigration attorney who has represented clients in two all-foreign prisons told me that CAR facilities lack law libraries, training and educational programs, and recreational equipment.197
There is also evidence that all-foreign prisons are violent places to
live and work. In 2012, “a Correctional Officer was killed and 20 people
were injured during a riot at the Adams County Correctional Center” in
Natchez, Mississippi, which began when 250 prisoners protested “low–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
191 To permit me to write to prisoners, the Institutional Review Board (IRB) at the University of
Chicago required me to obtain approval from the Bureau of Prisons, which denied my request.
Letter from Judi Simon Garrett, Assistant Dir. for Info., Policy, & Pub. Affairs, Fed. Bureau of
Prisons, to author (Apr. 12, 2018) (on file with the Harvard Law School Library). When pressed
for explanation, BOP said that research on noncitizens is not generalizable to the whole prison
population and therefore “fails to contribute to the advancement of knowledge about corrections”;
that asking prisoners where they would like to be housed “doesn’t make sense” because prisoners
have no choice in housing placements; and that even “if everything [were] perfect and the [BOP’s
internal] IRB approved [my study], the Agency wouldn’t approve it.” Telephone Call with Dr. Jody
Klein-Saffran, Researcher, Office of Research & Evaluation, Fed. Bureau of Prisons (Apr. 18, 2018).
BOP also warned that letters I sent without their approval would be confiscated and reported to
the Agency’s central office. Id.
192 See TRULINC Locations, FED. BUREAU PRISONS, https://www.bop.gov/inmates/trulincs.
jsp [https://perma.cc/JC2A-5GJM].
193 See OIG, REVIEW OF CONTRACT PRISONS, supra note 171, at i–iii.
194 See, e.g., Seth Freed Wessler, A Guide to Our Investigation of Deaths Inside Immigrant-Only
Prisons, INVESTIGATIVE FUND (Jan. 28, 2016), https://www.theinvestigativefund.org/blog/2016/
01/28/guide-investigation-deaths-inside-immigrant-prisons/ [https://perma.cc/A3K2-SZMM].
195 See ACLU, WAREHOUSED AND FORGOTTEN: IMMIGRANTS TRAPPED IN OUR SHADOW
PRIVATE PRISON SYSTEM 13 (2014).
196 See sources cited supra notes 193–195.
197 Interview with Anonymous Immigration Attorney (Nov. 7, 2017).
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quality food and medical care.”198 In 2015, BOP transferred 2800 prisoners out of Willacy County Correctional Center, an all-foreign prison
in Texas, after an uprising “rendered the facility uninhabitable.”199 The
same year, the DOJ Inspector General reported that a now-closed CAR
facility in Pecos, Texas, had too few staff for its security and medical
needs.200 That prison was the site of two riots between 2008 and 2009,
during which prisoners set the institution on fire.201
These reports are unsurprising given the connection between prison
programs and prison violence. For years, criminologists and sociologists
have argued that “chronic idleness” increases the risk of prison violence
and that educational and occupational programs reduce it.202 BOP itself
has frequently stated that idleness leads to prison “disruptions.”203 It
makes sense, then, that prisons with fewer programs would be especially
volatile. These prisons are not only separate from the rest of the prison
system. In practice, and perhaps by design, they are worse than other
prisons.
All-foreign prisons are also remote. Few are near a city with an
active pro bono immigration bar,204 and as noted above, even email access to these institutions is curtailed. This isolation affects prisoners’
ability to litigate their immigration cases. Attorneys who have visited
all-foreign facilities report that prisoners rarely have legal representation.205 Instead, if they contest deportation, prisoners represent themselves — often in video teleconference hearings, which are an increasingly common alternative to in-person adjudication of immigration

–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
198 OIG, REVIEW OF CONTRACT PRISONS, supra note 171, at 2; see also Affidavit of Casey
Markovitz, United States v. Lopez-Fuentes, No. 12-mj-00160 (S.D. Miss. Aug. 8, 2012), ECF No. 1.
199 Kenneth R. Rosen, Inmates to Be Transferred After Riot at Texas Prison, N.Y. TIMES (Feb.
21, 2015), https://nyti.ms/1zXkNm3 [https://perma.cc/2E88-RL9X].
200 OIG, REEVES AUDIT, supra note 155, at ii–iii.
201 Id. at i; see also Janet DiGiacomo, Texas Riot Quelled; Inmates Damage Building, CNN (Feb.
1, 2009), http://www.cnn.com/2009/US/02/01/texas.prison.riot/index.html [https://perma.cc/D4A4K2SQ].
202 See Craig Haney, The Wages of Prison Overcrowding: Harmful Psychological Consequences
and Dysfunctional Correctional Reactions, 22 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 265, 275 (2006) (collecting
research on the “negative psychological and behavioral effects” of idleness).
203 See, e.g., U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-11-893, BUREAU OF PRISONS:
IMPROVED EVALUATIONS AND INCREASED COORDINATION COULD IMPROVE CELL PHONE
DETECTION 12 (2011) (quoting BOP’s views on idleness).
204 See ACLU, supra note 195, at 56 n.212 (noting that the State Bar of Texas listed no pro bono
immigration attorneys near any of five CAR prisons in Texas); see also Where You Live Impacts Ability
to Obtain Representation in Immigration Court, TRANSACTIONAL RECS. ACCESS
CLEARINGHOUSE (Aug. 7, 2017), http://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/477/ [https://perma.cc/
D3C5-RXNW] (mapping geographic disparities in the odds of obtaining immigration representation).
205 See ACLU, supra note 195, at 56.
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cases.206 Professor Ingrid Eagly’s work on immigration detention indicates that televideo cases are more likely to result in deportation than
in-person immigration hearings.207 This finding suggests that the outcomes of CAR prisoners’ cases may be worse than if they had better
access to lawyers and in-person immigration courts.
All-foreign prisons also isolate noncitizens from their families in the
United States.208 As a matter of policy, BOP attempts to hold prisoners
within 500 miles of the location where they have the most “community
and/or family support.”209 Noncitizens, however, are often held much
farther from home. BOP expressly exempts prisoners with detainers
(including long-term legal residents) from its 500-mile rule, which means
that noncitizen prisoners can be transferred anywhere in the country.210
The Agency’s internal data show that, on average, CAR prisoners are
held 737 miles from the place where they were sentenced and that more
than half of all CAR prisoners are held over 500 miles from home.211
By contrast, the average distance between integrated prisons and prisoners’ sentencing jurisdiction is 517 miles and only a third of the prisoners in integrated facilities are more than 500 miles from home.212 It
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
206 See Ingrid V. Eagly, Remote Adjudication in Immigration, 109 NW. U. L. REV. 933, 934 (2015);
see also Press Release, Office of Pub. Affairs, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Attorney General Sessions Announces Expansion and Modernization of Program to Deport Criminal Aliens Housed in Federal
Correctional Facilities (Mar. 30, 2017), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/attorney-general-sessionsannounces-expansion-and-modernization-program-deport-criminal [https://perma.cc/YC62-CKDG]
(announcing an initiative to “increase each [prison] facility’s [televideo] capabilities”).
207 Eagly, supra note 206, at 937.
208 There are no good statistics on how many CAR prisoners have family members in the United
States. Anecdotally, immigration attorneys report that most long-term permanent residents have
family in the country and that prisoners charged with illegal reentry are less likely to have U.S.citizen family members. Nationally, an estimated 4.5 million U.S.-citizen children live with an
unauthorized immigrant parent. RANDY CAPPS ET AL., IMPLICATIONS OF IMMIGRATION
ENFORCEMENT ACTIVITIES FOR THE WELL-BEING OF CHILDREN IN IMMIGRANT
FAMILIES 7 (2015) (reporting data from ICE). And in 2013, ICE deported approximately 72,000
parents of U.S.-citizen children. Id. at 1.
209 FED. BUREAU OF PRISONS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 159, ch. 7, at 4.
210 Id.; see supra note 149 (explaining why a detainer exemption will cover almost every noncitizen in federal prison).
211 See 2018 FOIA Materials, supra note 7. The median distance between CAR prisoners’ place
of sentencing and prison placement is 516 miles. See id. These figures are based on BOP data on
CAR prisoners’ place of sentencing and Google Maps searches of the distance between each CAR
prison and the country’s 94 district courts. When mapping distances between prisons and sentencing jurisdictions, I opted for the shortest driving distance, or where necessary, flying distance. These
statistics omit the one prisoner in Great Plains Correctional Institution who was sentenced by the
U.S. Army. They also assume that prisoners were sentenced close to home. Although this assumption is unlikely to be accurate in all cases, sentencing jurisdiction is the best proxy I have for home
given the available data.
212 These are figures from a separate study I am currently conducting on the federal prison system. In response to a new FOIA request, BOP has provided me with data on all federal prisoners’
sentencing jurisdictions. See Letter from Sarah Lilly, Fed. Bureau of Prisons, to author (Mar. 7,
2018) (on file with the author). An initial review of that material indicates that the median distance
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would take a more detailed study of the entire federal prison system to
conclude that citizens are held closer to home than foreign nationals, but
these figures raise the prospect of a penal estate in which noncitizens are
purposefully concentrated in the most remote penal institutions and are
disproportionately far from their families as a result.213
Of course, isolation from family, access to counsel, and idleness are
problems endemic to American prisons, not just all-foreign prisons. And
there may be practical benefits to incarceration in an all-foreign facility.
Ethnographic research in European prisons suggests that housing prisoners facing deportation together can encourage prisoners to share information and develop coping strategies.214 Penal institutions are complex ecosystems, in which questions of prisoner welfare are dynamic and
opaque.215 There is, however, little question that all-foreign prisons are
meant to be spare institutions. These prisons were built, from the very
beginning, on the idea that foreigners are entitled to less.
B. Two-Track Criminal Justice
The rise of the all-foreign prison also raises more structural concerns
about the criminal justice system. As Part I demonstrated, these prisons
emerged alongside policies preventing early release of foreign national
prisoners and restricting their access to a host of prison services, including drug treatment, occupational training, and educational programs.216
Together, these policies make noncitizens less costly to incarcerate and
more certain to serve their full prison sentences.217
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
between integrated prisons and prisoners’ sentencing jurisdictions is 319 miles and that 36% of
prisoners in integrated facilities are more than 500 miles from home. See id. To be clear, these are
prison-level data, not data on individual prisoners, which BOP declined to provide. See id. Data
on integrated prisons include the noncitizens in those facilities. See id.
213 I assume here that most federal prisoners come from cities and that most prisons are outside
urban centers. Several studies suggest that prisoners disproportionately come from cities, and indeed, from particular city blocks. See, e.g., BENJAMIN FORMAN, LAURA VAN DER LUGT & BEN
GOLDBERG, BOS. INDICATORS PROJECT, THE GEOGRAPHY OF INCARCERATION 6–9 (2016)
(mapping incarceration rates in Boston); see also SPATIAL INFO. DESIGN LAB, COLUMBIA UNIV.
GRADUATE SCH. OF ARCHITECTURE, PLANNING AND PRES., THE PATTERN: MILLION
DOLLAR BLOCKS (2008) (mapping incarceration patterns in Phoenix, Wichita, New Orleans, and
New York). If these assumptions are correct, exempting noncitizens from the 500-mile rule would
make it easier to keep U.S. citizens close to home.
214 EMMA KAUFMAN, PUNISH AND EXPEL: BORDER CONTROL, NATIONALISM, AND THE
NEW PURPOSE OF THE PRISON 129 (2015).
215 For studies of the relationship between custodial conditions and prisoner welfare, see MARY
BOSWORTH, INSIDE IMMIGRATION DETENTION (2014); and ALISON LIEBLING, PRISONS
AND THEIR MORAL PERFORMANCE: A STUDY OF VALUES, QUALITY, AND PRISON LIFE
(2004).
216 See supra pp. 1400–01, 1409.
217 See OIG, REVIEW OF CONTRACT PRISONS, supra note 171, at 12 (“[T]he average annual
costs in the BOP institutions and the contract [all-foreign] prisons per capita were $24,426 and
$22,488, respectively.”).
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This approach to noncitizens has troubling implications. The political economy of punishment is far too complex to argue that all-foreign
prisons are driving a boom in the prosecution of foreign nationals.218
But it is worth noting that BOP has made a subset of prisoners cheaper
and easier to incarcerate and worth asking whether this development
could skew federal criminal law enforcement toward crimes committed
by foreigners rather than those that are most pervasive or severe.
Consider the characteristics of this prison population: noncitizens
can be held in stripped-down, low-security facilities; they can be transferred anywhere in the United States; they serve their entire sentences;
and they lack the ability to vote. Such prisoners may be especially attractive to criminal justice stakeholders with organized lobbies, including private prison companies, which typically receive a “unit price per
inmate” for each prisoner they hold.219 To the extent that the costs of
imprisonment affect front-end criminal justice policy — and some evidence suggests that they do220 — there is a distinct incentive to favor
the prosecution and incarceration of foreigners. Noncitizens’ relative
political powerlessness, meanwhile, makes the threat of legal distortions
particularly acute.
At a more basic level, the all-foreign prison reflects a shift at the tail
end of a system in which foreign nationals are already treated differently
at key stages of the criminal process, including bail and sentencing. The
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
218 For discussions of the political economy of punishment, see NICOLA LACEY, THE
PRISONERS’ DILEMMA: POLITICAL ECONOMY AND PUNISHMENT IN CONTEMPORARY
DEMOCRACIES (2008); SIMON, supra note 36.
219 OIG, REEVES AUDIT, supra note 155, at 9. Most CAR contracts provide a fixed sum with a
bonus “price per inmate” once the prison reaches a certain capacity. Id. at 8–9. One contract from
2007, for example, provides for base compensation of $4 million per month with a bonus of $16.87
“unit price per inmate that only applies when the daily population of inmates exeeds 90 percent” of
capacity. Id. at 9. Low-cost prisoners with fixed terms may also be attractive to public prison
officers, who have organized unions and “rely on the continued strength of the prison industry for
their job security.” Avlana K. Eisenberg, Incarceration Incentives in the Decarceration Era, 69
VAND. L. REV. 71, 93 (2016).
220 For reports on prison lobbies, see Laura Sullivan, Prison Economics Help Drive Ariz. Immigration Law, NPR (Oct. 28, 2010, 11:01 AM), https://n.pr/9paAzO [https://perma.cc/G49Q-MD9M],
which draws on “hundreds of pages of campaign finance reports, lobbying documents and corporate
records” to describe the private prison industry’s lobbying power. See also Joshua Page, Prison
Officer Unions and the Perpetuation of the Penal Status Quo, 10 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y
735, 736 (2011) (“[P]rison officer unions and their allies have fiercely and effectively resisted . . .
major efforts to downsize prisons.”). And for some limited but potentially relevant evidence that
prison costs can affect prosecution patterns, see Joan Petersilia, California Prison Downsizing and
Its Impact on Local Criminal Justice Systems, 8 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 327, 345 (2014), which
found that California’s prison realignment “requir[ing] counties to internalize the costs of conviction
and sentencing” encouraged prosecutors to rethink whether to seek custodial sanctions. See also
Aurélie Ouss, Incentive Structures and Criminal Justice 17 (Dec. 2017) (on file with the Harvard
Law School Library) (finding that shifting the cost burden of juvenile incarceration to counties from
states resulted in a drop in incarceration).
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Bail Reform Act of 1984221 requires temporary detention of noncitizens
who pose a flight risk,222 and practitioners report that noncitizens are
less likely both to seek and to receive bail.223 As to sentencing, in a
study published in 2014, sociologists found that noncitizens in federal
court are “far more likely to be incarcerated and sentenced for longer
periods” than U.S. citizens,224 a “punishment gap” that widened in districts with a “larger influx” of noncitizens in recent years.225 This research hints at the emergence of an entirely separate justice system for
foreigners, of which the all-foreign prison is only one small part.
C. Ethnic Segregation Reinvented
Finally, all-foreign prisons build ethnic segregation into the federal
prison system. Some context helps to explain how notable this development is. Federal prisons were segregated by race until the 1950s.226
During the 1970s and 80s, the Bureau developed Sentry, a computerized
system to track prisoners’ demographic data,227 and then began to publish policies requiring “racial balance” in prison housing.228 In a 1980
directive, for example, BOP expressed its “intent that one racial group
should not be assigned to one particular work detail or to one housing
unit.”229 That policy instructed officials to be “alert to the racial” distribution of prisons and to “make new designations attempting to keep
these proportions in balance.”230 More recent prison regulations prohibit racial and national origin discrimination in prison housing,231 and
as of 2006, BOP claimed to monitor “the racial composition of its institutions . . . as necessary to ensure that the [prisons do] not become de
facto segregated.”232
All-foreign prisons represent a marked departure from this halfcentury trend toward prison integration. Although these institutions are
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
221 Pub. L. No. 98-473, tit. 2, ch. 1, 98 Stat. 1976 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 3141-3150
(2012)).
222 18 U.S.C. § 3142(d). This provision does not apply to lawful permanent residents. Id.
§ 3142(d)(1)(B).
223 GRABER & SCHNITZER, supra note 149, at 1 (“[N]oncitizen defendants who do make bail
are often transferred to immigration custody instead of being released. This practice is so common
that some noncitizens do not seek bail because they fear such a transfer.”).
224 Light, Massoglia & King, supra note 3, at 841.
225 Id. at 840; see also id. at 840–42.
226 MARY BOSWORTH, THE U.S. FEDERAL PRISON SYSTEM 130 (2002).
227 KEVE, supra note 44, at 235.
228 FED. BUREAU OF PRISONS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, PROGRAM STATEMENT 5100.1 § 3,
at 2 (1980) (capitalization omitted).
229 Id.
230 Id.
231 See, e.g., 28 C.F.R. § 551.90 (2018).
232 Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 25, Johnson v. California,
543 U.S. 499 (2005) (No. 03-636).
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formally classified by alienage, almost all of the prisoners inside them
are Latino. As of January 2018, 89% of CAR prisoners were born in
Mexico, the Dominican Republic, Cuba, or Central or South America.233
In 2016, GEO Group, the company that runs the largest number of allforeign prisons, described CAR facilities as “very homogenous, with
72.1% being from Mexico and the majority of the rest being from a few
Central American countries.”234 The same year, another prison contractor reported that “90% of the inmates in [all-foreign prisons] are
Mexicans,”235 and in contract solicitations, the Bureau has stated that
CAR prisoners are “primarily Mexican.”236
In thinking through these figures, it is important to distinguish race,
ethnicity, alienage, and national origin. The fact that CAR prisoners are
“primarily Mexican” does not necessarily mean they are all the same
race, ethnicity, or citizenship status. A person born in Mexico could, for
example, be a naturalized American citizen who identifies as white or a
British citizen who identifies as black and Jewish. One could imagine
endless combinations to illustrate the differences between a “social system that uses skin color as the criterion for classification,”237 identification with a particular set of cultural practices, place of birth, and legal
citizenship status.
But it is also crucial to acknowledge the slippage between these concepts. The terms “race” and “nation” were used interchangeably
throughout the nineteenth century.238 When government officials began
to record immigrants’ nationalities in the early 1900s, they referred not
to Irish, Chinese, Polish, or Italian nationals, but to the Irish, Chinese,
Polish, and Italian races.239 The first federal immigration statutes were
explicitly racist,240 and federal immigration law retained race-based restrictions until 1965.241 Race and nationality, in other words, have long
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
233
234
235

See 2018 FOIA Materials, supra note 7.
Letter from Patricia McNair Persante, supra note 23, at 2.
Letter from Scott Marquardt, President, Mgmt. & Training Corp., to Deputy Assistant Inspector Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice 1 (Aug. 9, 2016) (on file with the Harvard Law School Library).
236 Letter from Ryan Wynne, supra note 24, at 1.
237 TUKUFU ZUBERI & EDUARDO BONILLA-SILVA, WHITE LOGIC, WHITE METHODS:
RACISM AND METHODOLOGY 10 (2008).
238 NGAI, supra note 74, at 23.
239 See id. at 25.
240 See, e.g., Kristin A. Collins, Illegitimate Borders: Jus Sanguinis Citizenship and the Legal
Construction of Family, Race, and Nation, 123 YALE L.J. 2134, 2154–58 (2014) (providing a primer
on “racially nativist” immigration laws, id. at 2154); Louis Henkin, Essay, The Constitution and
United States Foreign Sovereignty: A Century of Chinese Exclusion and Its Progeny, 100 HARV. L.
REV. 853, 855 (1987) (connecting early federal immigration law to “growing ‘nativism,’ racism, and
xenophobia”); Kevin R. Johnson, Race Matters: Immigration Law and Policy Scholarship, Law in
the Ivory Tower, and the Legal Indifference of the Race Critique, 2000 U. ILL. L. REV. 525, 529
(describing the “now-obvious racist premises” of early federal immigration laws).
241 IAN F. HANEY LÓPEZ, WHITE BY LAW: THE LEGAL CONSTRUCTION OF RACE 37
(1996).
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been related. Today they remain deeply interwoven features of individual identity.242
If prisoners born in Mexico, Cuba, and Central and South America
are Latino, then Latino noncitizens appear to be significantly overrepresented in all-foreign prisons. According to BOP statistics, 75% of all
noncitizens in federal prisons are from Mexico, Colombia, Cuba, or the
Dominican Republic.243 Yet nearly 90% of the noncitizens in CAR prisons are from those countries.244 This is a stark contrast, particularly
given that the offenses for which noncitizens have been sentenced are
roughly the same in segregated and integrated prisons.245 These figures
indicate that BOP may be sending Latino noncitizens to segregated prisons at disproportionately high rates relative to non-Latino noncitizens.
Of course, this is only suggestive evidence of profiling. Drawing conclusions about whether, all else equal, Latino noncitizens are more likely
to be segregated would require much more detailed information on individual prisoners, which BOP declined to provide.246 But it is fair to
say that the proportion of Latino noncitizens is higher in segregated than
in integrated prisons. This statement raises concerns about profiling,
which are amplified by the fact that prison officials described early allforeign prisons as institutions “targeted at the Mexican citizens”247 and
until the 1980s referred to noncitizens in policy documents not as “aliens” but as “Mexican aliens.”248
Separately, BOP’s data also show that the use of CAR prisons reduces the overall number of Latino prisoners in integrated prisons by
five percent.249 This figure, unlike the previous ones, includes U.S. citizens — the point here is that, in populating CAR prisons, BOP pulls
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
242 For a classic account of intersectionality, see Kimberle Crenshaw, Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics, and Violence Against Women of Color, 43 STAN. L. REV. 1241
(1991). For a recent critique, see Janel Thamkul, Comment, The Plenary Power–Shaped Hole in
the Core Constitutional Law Curriculum: Exclusion, Unequal Protection, and American National
Identity, 96 CALIF. L. REV. 553 (2008).
243 See Inmate Citizenship, supra note 9.
244 See 2018 FOIA Materials, supra note 7.
245 See supra p. 1404. There is not, for example, a greater percentage of “immigration offenders”
in CAR facilities than in integrated prisons. See supra p. 1404.
246 To determine whether Latino noncitizens are more likely to be segregated than similarly situated non-Latino noncitizens, one would need to control for relevant factors such as sentence length,
release date, security classification, and proximity to home — which, in turn, requires data on individual prisoners. BOP rejected a FOIA request for that data. See Letter from Ian Guy, supra note
27.
247 See Hearing Before Subcomm. on Immigration, supra note 26, at 91 (statement of John L.
Clark, Assistant Director, Community Corrections and Detention, Federal Bureau of Prisons).
248 FED. BUREAU OF PRISONS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CHANGE NOTICE CN-4 TO
PROGRAM STATEMENT 5100.1 (1981).
249 Compare Inmate Ethnicity, FED. BUREAU PRISONS (Sept. 29, 2018), https://www.bop.gov/
about/statistics/statistics_inmate_ethnicity.jsp [https://perma.cc/3UE9-M3AF] (stating that 32.2%
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Latino prisoners out of other prisons and thereby reduces the number of
Latino people in the rest of the prison system. This is, in other words,
a claim about the disparate impact CAR prisons have on Latino prisoners rather than a claim about profiling among noncitizens. Both sorts
of claims illustrate the close connection between alienage and ethnicity.
To be clear, not all CAR prisoners are from Mexico, Central America,
or South America. All-foreign prisons hold people born in Israel, Iraq,
Nepal, Norway, Japan, Russia, and the United Kingdom, to name just
a few countries.250 Even if every CAR prisoner were Latino, moreover,
courts would not necessarily treat these as prisons segregated by ethnicity. Over the last forty years, courts have built a stringent intent requirement into equal protection doctrine, foreclosing disparate impact
claims and frustrating efforts to combat racial bias in the criminal justice system.251 Absent evidence that BOP purposefully built or uses allforeign prisons in order to isolate Latino prisoners, a court would almost
certainly evaluate these prisons as an instance of alienage rather than
racial or ethnic classification. Part III examines how this conceptualization of the all-foreign prison affects its legality.
Here the point is that, even if they are not the product of invidious
intent to segregate Latino prisoners, BOP’s alienage policies have introduced widespread ethnic segregation into the federal prison system.
This development raises questions about how BOP identifies which
noncitizens to send to all-foreign prisons and undermines the Agency’s
prohibition on national origin discrimination in prison housing.252
The birth of the all-foreign prison also sharpens critiques of American
criminal justice, which tend to focus on race. There is no question that
imprisonment, and in particular mass incarceration, is intimately tied to
racial inequality.253 But the emergence of a second-class prison system
for foreigners suggests that, to understand the use of penal institutions,
scholars ought to think not only about race but also about citizenship,
and more to the point, about the links between the two. At least in one
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
of the total federal prison population is Hispanic), with 2018 FOIA Materials, supra note 7 (showing
that 27% of people in integrated prisons are Hispanic).
250 See 2018 FOIA Materials, supra note 7.
251 Kenji Yoshino, The New Equal Protection, 124 HARV. L. REV. 747, 782 (2011); see also Aziz
Z. Huq, What Is Discriminatory Intent?, 103 CORNELL L. REV. 1211, 1225–31 (2018). But see
infra note 285 (discussing variation in when courts are willing to infer discriminatory intent).
252 See 28 C.F.R. § 551.90 (2018).
253 For a sample of the large body of writing on mass incarceration and race, see Forman, supra
note 35; Bernard E. Harcourt, Reducing Mass Incarceration: Lessons from the Deinstitutionalization of Mental Hospitals in the 1960s, 9 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 53 (2011); Tracey L. Meares, Reaction
Essay, Mass Incarceration: Who Pays the Price for Criminal Offending?, 3 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB.
POL’Y 295 (2004); Dorothy E. Roberts, The Social and Moral Cost of Mass Incarceration in African
American Communities, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1271 (2004).
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corner of the justice system, alienage now determines the location, conditions, and duration of incarceration. This new mode of punishment
complicates the relationship between imprisonment and race, and as
Part III explains, shifts legal debates about segregation onto extremely
unsettled ground.
III. THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF SEGREGATION
At first pass, prisons segregated by alienage seem like an obvious
violation of equal protection principles. Noncitizens are an identifiable,
formally marginalized, and historically disfavored group — or as the
Supreme Court put it in 1971, a “prime example of a ‘discrete and insular’ minority for whom . . . heightened judicial solicitude is appropriate.”254 For more than a century, courts have treated criminal prosecution and punishment as forms of state action that give rise to alienageneutral rights, including the right to counsel and a jury trial.255 And
courts have long been skeptical of prison policies that result in racial or
ethnic segregation.256 All-foreign prisons are in deep tension with these
equality norms.
Yet these prisons also sit at the intersection of powerful strains of
judicial deference, which alter equality doctrines. As prisons, these institutions are protected by what I call the penal power doctrine, a transsubstantive rule under which courts defer to prison officials in cases
involving prisoners’ constitutional rights.257 As federal institutions, they
are insulated by the plenary power doctrine, a rule that limits judicial
review of alienage classifications drawn by the federal government.258
These doctrines shift power to prison administrators and produce an
equal protection jurisprudence that has remarkably little to say about
segregation by citizenship.
This Part explores the constitutionality of all-foreign prisons, which
is a question of first impression. It begins by examining why these institutions seem so objectionable, an intuition I link to the legacy of
Brown v. Board of Education259 and the doctrinal distinction between
deportation and punishment. It then explains how deference doctrines
shield all-foreign prisons from meaningful judicial review, a problem
Part IV will argue that courts ought to fix.

–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
254 Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 372 (1971) (quoting United States v. Carolene Prods.
Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938)).
255 See infra notes 267–270 and accompanying text.
256 See infra section III.A, pp. 1419–24.
257 See infra pp. 1424–26.
258 See infra pp. 1426–31.
259 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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A. Equality Norms
All-foreign prisons clash with two distinct strands of constitutional
law. First, they depart from a century of cases suggesting that citizenship status is irrelevant to a person’s treatment in the criminal justice
system. The inaugural case in this line of doctrine is Wong Wing v.
United States,260 an 1896 challenge to a statute that subjected Chinese
nationals “found unlawfully in the United States” to hard labor in prison
without a jury trial.261 Reasoning that a year of hard labor in the Detroit
House of Correction constituted “infamous punishment,” the Supreme
Court held that the Fifth and Sixth Amendments applied to Wong Wing
and required “a judicial trial to establish the guilt of the accused.”262
Wong Wing is typically cited as the first case to extend criminal procedure rights to noncitizens.263 For these purposes, however, the most
interesting feature of the case is the Court’s reliance on a sharp distinction between punishment and deportation. To reach the conclusion that
Wong Wing was entitled to a trial, the Supreme Court turned to Fong
Yue Ting v. United States,264 a case from three years earlier in which the
Court had held that, because it was not punishment, deportation failed
to implicate the “provisions of the Constitution, securing the right of
trial by jury, and prohibiting unreasonable searches and seizures, and
cruel and unusual punishments.”265 The upshot of this holding, the
Court concluded, was that the imposition of punishment does trigger
constitutional protections, alienage notwithstanding.266
The idea that punishment — or the threat of criminal punishment —
requires alienage-neutral rights has percolated in American law ever
since. Based on this proposition, courts have held or implied that noncitizens are entitled to Miranda warnings when arrested for a crime,267
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
260
261
262
263

163 U.S. 228 (1896).
Id. at 229–30.
Id. at 237–38.
See, e.g., Adam B. Cox & Eric A. Posner, The Second-Order Structure of Immigration Law,
59 STAN. L. REV. 809, 824 (2007) (citing Wong Wing as the case that “guarantee[d] criminal process
protections to noncitizens charged with crimes”); Hiroshi Motomura, The Curious Evolution of Immigration Law: Procedural Surrogates for Substantive Constitutional Rights, 92 COLUM. L. REV.
1625, 1689 (1992) (describing Wong Wing as “the original extension . . . of criminal procedure to
aliens”); cf. David Cole, Are Foreign Nationals Entitled to the Same Constitutional Rights as Citizens?, 25 T. JEFFERSON L. REV. 367, 370 (2003) (noting that, as a textual matter, criminal procedure rights apply to “persons” rather than “citizens”).
264 149 U.S. 698 (1893).
265 Wong Wing, 163 U.S. at 236 (quoting Fong Yue Ting, 149 U.S. at 730).
266 Id. at 236–37.
267 United States v. Henry, 604 F.2d 908, 914 (5th Cir. 1979) (“[A]n alien who is within the territorial jurisdiction of this country, whether it be at the border or in the interior, in a proper case and
at the proper time, is entitled to those protections guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment in criminal
proceedings which would include the Miranda warning.”).
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cannot be compelled to testify against themselves in criminal proceedings,268 have a right to effective criminal counsel,269 and are covered by
the “Eighth Amendment, the ex post facto clause, the double jeopardy
clause, and other attendant criminal protections.”270
There are both narrow and broad ways to understand these cases.
Wong Wing and its progeny can be read simply to establish that noncitizens bear a certain bundle of procedural rights (and potentially lack
others) when charged with a crime. Professors Eric Posner and Adam
Cox describe the case this way.271 In this view, noncitizens have only
the basic procedural rights courts have already afforded them, and it
remains unclear whether substantive rights like equal protection and
postconviction rights like freedom from cruel and unusual punishment
apply to foreign nationals in the criminal justice system.
But the holding in Wong Wing did not stem from a conclusion about
noncitizens’ individual rights. It flowed from a theory of punishment,
and specifically, from the idea that punishment is different from deportation in ways that require alienage-neutral protections to ensure its legitimacy. The Court’s reliance on a categorical distinction between punishment and deportation suggests a broader equality principle: any time
the state is punishing someone, alienage is irrelevant to constitutional
limits on the exercise of state power. On this account, citizens and foreigners enjoy the same rights when the state decides to punish them
because punishment brings a person into the political fold, which is to
say, punishment instantiates a relationship between the state and the
criminal that makes alienage immaterial to the Constitution’s reach.
Wong Wing, in other words, was not about whether noncitizens had particular procedural rights. The case was about the structural conditions
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
268 United States v. Balsys, 524 U.S. 666, 671 (1998) (noting that “[r]esident aliens” are protected
by the Self-Incrimination Clause of the Fifth Amendment in criminal proceedings).
269 Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 366 (2010) (applying the Sixth Amendment’s guarantee of
effective criminal counsel to a noncitizen).
270 See Hinds v. Lynch, 790 F.3d 259, 264 (1st Cir. 2015) (“[B]ecause removal is not intended to
punish, federal courts have consistently held that the Eighth Amendment, the ex post facto clause,
the double jeopardy clause, and other attendant criminal protections do not apply to orders of removal.”). Hinds does not extend criminal procedure protections to noncitizens; it concludes that
those protections do not extend to deportation proceedings because deportation is not punishment.
Id. As in Wong Wing, the negative implication of this holding seems to be that these protections
would apply if punishment were at issue. But of course, a court could conclude that noncitizens
are not protected by the Eighth Amendment. Section III.C, infra pp. 1432–33, explores just how
underdetermined noncitizens’ rights are. Here the critical point is that courts consistently rely on
a distinction between punishment and deportation when interpreting the scope of noncitizens’ constitutional rights.
271 Adam B. Cox & Eric A. Posner, The Rights of Migrants: An Optimal Contract Framework,
84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1403, 1412 (2009) (citing Wong Wing for the proposition that noncitizens enjoy
“basic rights” including “the right to criminal process,” which “[i]n principle . . . could be denied” or
diminished).
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the Constitution attaches to the state’s authority to punish, regardless of
who is subject to that punishment.272
From this perspective, Wong Wing has much in common with a different line of cases. In a series of decisions stretching back to the early
1960s, courts have limited racial and ethnic segregation in penal institutions. Most of these cases arose in state prisons, which courts began to
desegregate in the aftermath of Brown v. Board of Education.273 In
early prison desegregation cases, the Supreme Court upheld orders integrating penal institutions, but left open the possibility that racial classification might be necessary for prison security in some circumstances.274
That suggestion set the stage for Johnson v. California,275 a 2005
equal protection challenge to California’s prison system.276 Johnson began when a pro se prisoner named Garrison Johnson objected to the
state’s unwritten policy of segregating prisoners during the first sixty
days of their incarceration.277 The policy at issue — which prison officials defended as a means “to prevent violence caused by racial gangs” —
segregated prisoners not only by race but also by ethnicity and nationality “within each racial group.”278 By the time the case reached the
Supreme Court, the question was whether the policy was subject to
strict scrutiny.279 The Court held that it was,280 and the California
Department of Corrections abandoned its policy on remand.281
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
272 Immigration scholars adopt this interpretation when they argue that immigration and criminal law are separate spheres of government authority. See, e.g., Eagly, supra note 86, at 1294 (“In
the criminal law context, however, Wong Wing is regarded as absolute.”); Stephen H. Legomsky,
The New Path of Immigration Law: Asymmetric Incorporation of Criminal Justice Norms, 64
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 469, 472 (2007) (distinguishing between an immigration law model with
relaxed constitutional protections and a “criminal justice model” that “operates under stringent constitutional and sub-constitutional constraints”); see also LINDA BOSNIAK, THE CITIZEN AND
THE ALIEN: DILEMMAS OF CONTEMPORARY MEMBERSHIP 53 (2006) (“[T]he [Wong Wing]
Court concluded that what was at stake . . . was not immigration regulation but criminal punishment, and that invocation of the government’s plenary power in the immigration sphere was therefore off the mark.”).
273 See, e.g., Washington v. Lee, 263 F. Supp. 327, 329 (M.D. Ala. 1966) (invalidating Alabama
statutes “requiring segregation by race in the state, county and city penal facilities”), aff’d 390 U.S.
333 (1968) (per curiam); see also Lamar v. Coffield, 951 F. Supp. 629, 630 (S.D. Tex. 1996) (describing
the history of a Texas prison desegregation suit initiated in the early 1970s).
274 Lee v. Washington, 390 U.S. 333 (1968) (per curiam) (upholding an order integrating Alabama
penal facilities); id. at 334 (Black, J., concurring) (clarifying that security needs might justify
segregation).
275 543 U.S. 499 (2005).
276 Id. at 502. The policy in Johnson segregated prisoners both upon their initial entrance to
prison and after any transfer within the prison system. Id.
277 Id. at 503.
278 Id. at 502.
279 Id.
280 Id. at 515.
281 Settlement and Release Agreement at 2, Johnson v. California, 336 F.3d 1117 (9th Cir. 2003)
(No. 01-56436) (“[The California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR)] has begun
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It is important not to overstate Johnson’s impact. The case decided
only the appropriate standard of review and in practice has not prevented racial and ethnic segregation in American prisons. It remains
common for prison officials to lock all prisoners of one race or ethnicity
in their cells in response to incidents of prison violence, a practice courts
have generally upheld so long as the lockdown is not “extended [or]
indefinite.”282
Still, Johnson marked a critical moment in equal protection law. The
case brought strict scrutiny into prisons, institutions that courts typically
police reluctantly.283 The Court, moreover, applied strict scrutiny to a
prison policy in which “Japanese-Americans [were] housed separately
from Chinese-Americans, and northern California Hispanics [were] separated from Southern California Hispanics.”284 The Johnson opinion
elided distinctions between race, ethnicity, and nationality, which may
simply reflect a flat-footed conception of race, but nonetheless suggests
that its holding extends beyond racial classification to more subtle, raceadjacent forms of prison segregation.285
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
formulating and implementing a plan by which inmates shall be housed at CDCR reception centers
without using race as the determinative housing criterion . . . .”).
282 In re Morales, 152 Cal. Rptr. 3d 123, 127 (Cal. Ct. App. 2013) (affirming an injunction against
“extended” race-based lockdowns in Pelican Bay prison but permitting prison officials to “separate
inmates on the basis of ethnicity . . . [o]n a short-term emergency basis” (alteration in original)). In
practice, “extended or indefinite” appears to mean something more than a few weeks and less than
several months. Compare, e.g., Fischer v. Ellegood, 238 F. App’x 428, 434 (11th Cir. 2007) (holding
that a race-based lockdown of unclear duration — plaintiff alleged several weeks; defendants argued several days — did not violate the Equal Protection Clause because it ended “after jail officials
thought the threat of racial violence had passed”), and Labranch v. Yates, No. 09-cv-00048, 2012
WL 3838380, at *11 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 4, 2012) (recommending summary judgment for defendants on
an equal protection challenge to a month-long lockdown of “Northern and Southern Hispanics,” id.
at *10, in Pleasant Valley State Prison), with Armstead v. Virga, No. 11-cv-1054, 2012 WL 2577562,
at *6 (E.D. Cal. July 3, 2012) (“Plaintiff’s allegations in the amended complaint regarding being
subject to an eleven month race-based lockdown state a colorable Equal Protection claim.”),
adopted in full, 2012 WL 6004205 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 29, 2012). For a critique on post-Johnson prison
housing policy in California, see also Philip Goodman, “It’s Just Black, White, or Hispanic”: An
Observational Study of Racializing Moves in California’s Segregated Prison Reception Centers, 42
L. & SOC’Y REV. 735 (2008).
283 Courts (mostly) declined to regulate prisons until the 1960s, and as section III.B explains,
infra pp. 1424–32, they have since reviewed prison policy with great deference. See MALCOLM M.
FEELEY & EDWARD L. RUBIN, JUDICIAL POLICY MAKING AND THE MODERN STATE: HOW
THE COURTS REFORMED AMERICA’S PRISONS 30–34 (1998) (describing the “Hands-Off Era”
between 1776 and 1960 during which courts declined to review prisoner complaints or otherwise
supervise prison management); Margo Schlanger, The Constitutional Law of Incarceration, Reconfigured, 103 CORNELL L. REV. 357, 365–69 (2018) (discussing prisoners’ rights jurisprudence before
the 1970s). For a classic example of the hands-off approach to prisons, see Ruffin v.
Commonwealth, 62 Va. (21 Gratt.) 790 (1871), in which prisoners are referred to as “slave[s] of the
State,” id. at 796.
284 Johnson, 543 U.S. at 502; see id. at 506.
285 Lower courts have interpreted Johnson this way, consistently applying its holding to ethnic
and other forms of prison segregation. See supra note 282 (collecting cases). Although I suspect
most courts would treat all-foreign prisons as sites of alienage classification with a disparate impact
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The Johnson Court also adopted a surprisingly institutional conception of the harm at issue in prison segregation. In the dominant account
of equal protection, the problem with segregation is the stigma it imposes on the segregated individual.286 In Johnson, by contrast, the Court
focused on the ways in which racial and ethnic segregation threatened
“the integrity of the criminal justice system.”287 The Johnson majority
stressed that racially segregated prisons undermined “public respect” for
criminal law288 and frustrated courts’ “efforts to eradicate racial prejudice from our criminal justice system.”289
This is not to say that Johnson renders all-foreign prisons unconstitutional. For reasons explained below, I suspect that most courts would
hold that it does not. But Johnson does capture courts’ deep suspicion
about prison policies that produce racial or ethnic segregation. That
suspicion may be motivated by an aversion to any racial classification;
there is no question that Johnson is part of an anticlassification canon
that includes cases on voting rights290 and affirmative action.291 Critically, though, Johnson also appears to be driven by a concern that segregating prisons has unacceptable expressive effects because of the
longstanding, vexed relationship between imprisonment and race.292
Like Wong Wing, Johnson presents the criminal justice system as a
domain in which formal inequality is especially harmful to the law’s
legitimacy.
Scholars seldom analyze these lines of doctrine side by side. It is
unusual to compare nineteenth-century immigration law with twentyfirst-century precedent on prison segregation. But both Johnson and
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
on Latino prisoners, courts remain deeply divided about when to infer discriminatory intent. See
Huq, supra note 251, at 1215 (“[T]he federal judiciary has not homed in upon a single definition of
discriminatory intent. Nor has it developed a consistent approach to the evidentiary tools through
which discriminatory intent is substantiated.”). For a relevant case on this issue, see Hernandez v.
Texas, 347 U.S. 475, 476–78 (1954), which held that, given “community norm[s]” in Jackson County,
Texas, “persons of Mexican descent” were a separate class entitled to Fourteenth Amendment protection, id. at 478.
286 See Reva B. Siegel, Equality Talk: Antisubordination and Anticlassification Values in Constitutional Struggles over Brown, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1470, 1472–73 (2004) (describing the traditional anticlassification account of segregation’s harm).
287 Johnson, 543 U.S. at 511.
288 Id.
289 Id. at 512 (quoting McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 309 (1987)).
290 See, e.g., Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 643 (1993).
291 See, e.g., Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 226 (1995); Richmond v. J.A.
Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493 (1989) (plurality opinion).
292 See generally RICHARD H. MCADAMS, THE EXPRESSIVE POWERS OF LAW: THEORIES
AND LIMITS (2015); Richard A. Primus, Equal Protection and Disparate Impact: Round Three, 117
HARV. L. REV. 493, 566–84 (2003). Of course, cases like McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, suggest
that the Court is not nearly serious enough about the race-related expressive effects of the criminal
justice system. In this respect, Johnson is an outlier — a case in which the Supreme Court embraced
an expressive, institutional conception of racism’s harm.
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Wong Wing are, at base, about the sort of equality the Constitution requires when the government places a person in prison. These cases
reflect entrenched norms against conditioning the quality of punishment
on race, alienage, or ethnicity. Indeed, they imply that discrimination
on those bases is particularly problematic when it coincides with the
power to punish — or, to use the Johnson Court’s language, when it
takes place “[i]n the prison context, when the government’s power is at
its apex.”293 Together, these cases suggest a theory of punishment in
which imprisonment is the sort of extraordinary state action that gives
rise to a heightened, affirmative duty to police inequality.
As the emergence of the all-foreign prison demonstrates, however,
this is a latent equality principle — a background norm in two areas of
law dominated, above all, by deference to government officials.
B. Deference Doctrines
Perhaps no two bodies of law are more preoccupied with deference
than prison and immigration law. In both fields, anxiety about the
proper role of the judiciary has become a transsubstantive principle that
shapes analysis of constitutional rights.
To begin with prison law, in cases involving prisoners’ constitutional
claims, courts apply a species of deference known as Turner review. The
Supreme Court invented this doctrine in Turner v. Safley,294 a 1987 case
concerning Missouri prison regulations that restricted inmate-to-inmate
correspondence and prohibited marriage absent permission from a
prison warden.295 The Court upheld the correspondence restriction and
invalidated the marriage regulation.296 In the process, it introduced a
two-step standard for assessing prisoners’ constitutional claims. Under
that standard, courts first ask whether the claimed right is “inconsistent
with [a person’s] status as a prisoner or with the legitimate penological
objectives of the corrections system.”297 If the right survives incarceration, courts consider whether its restriction is “reasonably related to legitimate penological interests.”298
In practice, the Turner test is a highly deferential form of rational
basis review that displaces governing constitutional doctrines when prisoners sue the state. Courts have applied Turner to a wide variety of

–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
293
294
295
296
297
298

Johnson, 543 U.S. at 511.
482 U.S. 78 (1987).
Id. at 81–82.
Id. at 91.
Id. at 95 (quoting Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 822 (1974)).
Id. at 89.
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prisoners’ constitutional claims, including due process and equal protection cases involving fundamental rights299 and First Amendment challenges to restrictions on visitation,300 prayer,301 and the receipt of
mail.302 In most cases, Turner review leads courts to uphold penal policies. As Professor Sharon Dolovich puts it, “it is a rare case decided
under Turner in which the plaintiff ultimately prevails.”303 In the context of these cases, Johnson was an aberration, a triumph for “normal”
equal protection analysis in an institution where constitutional doctrine
usually looks very different than it would outside prison walls.304
The Supreme Court has never articulated a clear rationale for its
deferential approach to prison policy. In Turner itself, the Court vacillated between a technocratic account in which courts defer to prison
officials’ expertise in prison administration and a stronger theory of restraint in which “separation of powers concerns” make prisoners’ rights

–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
299 See, e.g., O’Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 349 (1987) (“To ensure that courts afford
appropriate deference to prison officials, we have determined that prison regulations alleged to
infringe constitutional rights are judged under a ‘reasonableness’ test less restrictive than that ordinarily applied to alleged infringements of fundamental constitutional rights.”); Stojanovic v.
Humphreys, 309 F. App’x 48, 52 (7th Cir. 2009) (“Prisoners retain their right to equal protection;
nonetheless, where the disparate treatment is not based on a suspect class, like race, a prison may
treat inmates differently if the unequal treatment is rationally related to a legitimate penological
interest.”); Baranowski v. Hart, 486 F.3d 112, 123 (5th Cir. 2007) (“Turner applies with corresponding
force to equal protection claims.” (quoting Freeman v. Tex. Dep’t of Criminal Justice, 369 F.3d 854,
863 (5th Cir. 2004))); Victoria W. v. Larpenter, 369 F.3d 475, 484–85 (5th Cir. 2004) (assessing
whether prison policies requiring court orders for abortions were reasonably related to legitimate
penological interests); Goodwin v. Turner, 908 F.2d 1395, 1398 (8th Cir. 1990) (reviewing restrictions
on the “fundamental right to procreate” under Turner); Monmouth Cty. Corr. Inst. Inmates v.
Lanzaro, 834 F.2d 326, 333–44 (3d Cir. 1987) (applying Turner to prison policies restricting access
to abortions).
300 See, e.g., Overton v. Bazzetta, 539 U.S. 126, 136 (2003) (upholding a Michigan prison policy
imposing limits on visitation and banning all visits to prisoners by minors other than their children,
stepchildren, grandchildren, or siblings).
301 See, e.g., Williams v. Sec’y of Pa. Dep’t of Corr., 450 F. App’x 191, 195 (3d Cir. 2011) (upholding a Pennsylvania prison policy banning any prayer involving “ritual or display,” id. at 196, in
prison kitchens).
302 See, e.g., Parkhurst v. Lampert, 418 F. App’x 712, 715 (10th Cir. 2011) (upholding a prohibition on the receipt of bulk mailings). Note that different — but again deferential — tests apply to
prisoners’ Eighth Amendment and procedural due process claims. Prison officials are liable under
the Eighth Amendment only when officials are “deliberate[ly] indifferen[t]” to the “sufficiently substantial” risk of harm. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 843 (1994). A prisoner can state a due
process claim only if a prison policy imposes an “atypical and significant hardship . . . in relation to
the ordinary incidents of prison life.” Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484 (1995).
303 Dolovich, supra note 21, at 246.
304 The Johnson majority expressly rejected the argument that Turner review applied to racebased prison policy. Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 499, 513 (2005). Justices Thomas and Scalia,
typically skeptics of racial classification, dissented on the ground that prisons are one place where
institutional management trumps colorblindness. See id. at 524 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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something closer to a political question.305 Courts have also treated deference to state prison officials as a principle of federalism306 and in many
cases simply invoke ideas about the inherent dangerousness of penal
institutions to justify judicial restraint.307 These disparate ideas result
in a prisoners’ rights jurisprudence in which deference becomes its own
transsubstantive rule — call it the penal power doctrine — under which
prison administrators may infringe recognized constitutional rights in
ways that other state actors cannot.
In this respect, prison law is much like immigration law. The corollary to the penal power doctrine is the plenary power doctrine, which
holds that the federal government enjoys exclusive and expansive authority to regulate immigration. The precise contours of this doctrine
are a matter of endless debate,308 but it is generally understood to stand
for two principles. First, the federal government enjoys sole authority
to regulate migration and set naturalization policies.309 Professor
Cristina Rodríguez calls this the “federal exclusivity principle.”310 Second, judicial review is relaxed when the government is exercising its
immigration power.311 The plenary power doctrine thus has both horizontal and vertical dimensions — it is a federalism doctrine that limits
state and local control over immigration and a separation of powers
doctrine that restrains courts’ involvement in political branch decisions
on immigration policy.
Note here that I have described judicial review as relaxed rather than
nonexistent. The plenary power doctrine has evolved from its nineteenthcentury origins, when government decisions on the admission and deportation of noncitizens were essentially nonjusticiable, into a doctrine
of deference toward federal government entities that make and enforce
immigration laws.312 Today, the doctrine has more bite in substantive
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
305 Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 85 (1987); see also Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401, 407–08
(1989) (referring to those outside prisons, including courts, as “laymen” who lack the “expertise of
[prison] officials,” id. at 407).
306 See, e.g., Turner, 482 U.S. at 85 (“Where a state penal system is involved, federal courts
have . . . additional reason to accord deference to the appropriate prison authorities.”).
307 See, e.g., In re Long Term Admin. Segregation of Inmates Designated as Five Percenters, 174
F.3d 464, 469 (4th Cir. 1999) (“In the difficult and dangerous business of running a prison, frontline
officials are best positioned to foresee threats to order and to fashion responses to those threats.”).
308 See, e.g., Adam B. Cox, Citizenship, Standing, and Immigration Law, 92 CALIF. L. REV. 373,
378–81 (2004) (discussing the doctrine’s scope); Rodríguez, supra note 39, at 613 (describing the
“mountain of scholarly commentary” on the plenary power doctrine’s meaning).
309 Rodríguez, supra note 39, at 613.
310 Id.
311 Id.
312 See Kevin R. Johnson, Immigration in the Supreme Court, 2009–13: A New Era of Immigration Law Unexceptionalism, 68 OKLA. L. REV. 57, 58–59 (2015); Cornelia T.L. Pillard & T. Alexander
Aleinikoff, Skeptical Scrutiny of Plenary Power: Judicial and Executive Branch Decision Making
in Miller v. Albright, 1998 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 49; Peter H. Schuck, The Transformation of Immigration
Law, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 14–18 (1984).
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than procedural challenges to immigration decisions — courts have long
recognized and policed procedural rights in immigration hearings313 —
and application of the doctrine is inconsistent even in cases involving
the substance of immigration law.314 The plenary power doctrine is
therefore plenary in name only. Nonetheless, it persists as a sort of rebuttable presumption that courts ought to hesitate before applying normal standards of review in immigration cases.315
Critically for these purposes, the plenary power doctrine also endures
as a theory of judicial review in equal protection cases on alienage. As
noted at the outset, equal protection law on noncitizens is plagued by a
basic conceptual problem: foreign nationals are both equal and unequal
to citizens.
On one hand, noncitizens have strong moral, legal, historical, and
practical claims to equality. As a moral matter, noncitizens are humans
who differ from citizens only in that they lack legal membership. One
might think foreigners’ humanity entitles them to equality in all but the
narrowest set of cases where alienage distinctions are most justifiable.
As a legal matter, a noncitizen in the United States is subject to the
country’s laws and is thus, as Justice Brennan put it, “one of the governed.”316 If law derives its legitimacy from consent — if the Constitution
is a social contract — noncitizens’ accountability to American law should
bring with it that law’s protections. Professor Gerald Neuman calls this
the “mutuality of obligation” argument for noncitizens’ equality.317
As an historical matter, foreigners are some of the oldest “folk devils”
in American society.318 Throughout United States history, noncitizens
have been targeted for restrictive laws, detained, interned, and otherwise
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
313 See Motomura, supra note 263, at 1632–45; Rodríguez, supra note 39, at 613 (describing the
plenary power doctrine as “a theory of judicial review over immigration decisions, where courts
police process, but substance is considered a political question”).
314 See, e.g., Sessions v. Morales-Santana, 137 S. Ct. 1678, 1686 (2017) (applying heightened scrutiny to a “gender-based differential in the law governing acquisition of U.S. citizenship by a child
born abroad”); see also Kim, supra note 40, at 106–13 (collecting cases in which courts applied
normal standards of review to substantive challenges to immigration decisions).
315 One recent example here is Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2409 (2018), in which the Court
took an extremely deferential approach to review of the Trump Administration’s travel ban. See Adam
Cox, Ryan Goodman & Cristina Rodríguez, The Radical Supreme Court Travel Ban Opinion — But
Why It Might Not Apply to Other Immigrants’ Rights Cases, JUST SECURITY (June 27, 2018),
https://www.justsecurity.org/58510/radical-supreme-court-travel-ban-opinion-but-apply-immigrantsrights-cases/ [https://perma.cc/NW62-K3G9] (noting that Trump v. Hawaii represented an expansion of the plenary power doctrine).
316 United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 284 (1990) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
317 GERALD L. NEUMAN, STRANGERS TO THE CONSTITUTION 7 & n.a, 8 (1996).
318 I borrow this term from Stanley Cohen, who used it to describe groups cast as deviant outsiders, against whom a common morality and shared social order becomes clear. STANLEY
COHEN, FOLK DEVILS AND MORAL PANICS: THE CREATION OF THE MODS AND ROCKERS
10 (1972).
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identified as an unwelcome class.319 As Part II explained, this history
dovetails with the story of American racism, which, of course, includes
a period in which African Americans were denied legal protection on
the ground that they were not citizens of the United States.320 Given
the makeup of immigrant populations, it is extremely difficult to disentangle attitudes toward foreigners from beliefs about race. Noncitizens’
claim to equal protection can be located in these overlapping histories
of American xenophobia and racism, and, more broadly, in the concern
that governments often use the concept of citizenship to subordinate
disfavored groups.321
Finally, as a practical matter, one might support noncitizens’ equality
on the grounds that inequality can distort the legal system — recall the
discussion of skewed incentives from Part II — and impose harms on
United States citizens with foreign family members. The latter argument, in particular, has had traction in recent debates over citizens’
standing to challenge immigration laws.322
The point is not that these four arguments are infallible but rather
that there are compelling reasons to think noncitizens should be entitled
to equal treatment in the United States. The Supreme Court has recognized as much: the Equal Protection Clause has applied to foreign nationals since 1886,323 and more than four decades ago a unanimous
Court deemed noncitizens a suspect class.324
On the other hand, noncitizens are by definition unequal. To be a
noncitizen is to lack the rights that come with full membership in a
polity. Only those who embrace open borders can admit of no licit distinctions between citizens and foreigners. Assuming the nation-state,
and limits to the resources that can be delivered through it, the question
is not whether but how much alienage discrimination is constitutional.
Immigration law is in this sense a body of discrimination law, which
makes it very difficult to determine when discrimination on the basis of
citizenship is unlawful.

–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
319 For accounts of this history, see KANSTROOM, supra note 63; MOTOMURA, supra note 54;
and NGAI, supra note 74.
320 See Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 403–04 (1857).
321 See Lucas Guttentag, The Forgotten Equality Norm in Immigration Preemption: Discrimination, Harassment, and the Civil Rights Act of 1870, 8 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y 1, 10–
14 (2013).
322 See Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2415–16 (2018) (concluding that U.S. citizens have
standing to challenge the exclusion of their relatives); Cox, supra note 308, at 375 (arguing that
American “[c]itizens do have legally cognizable interests in the substance of immigration law”).
323 See Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 369 (1886).
324 Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 372 (1971) (citing United States v. Carolene Prods. Co.,
304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938)).
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Courts have resolved this conflict by resorting to “categorical federalism.”325 Under prevailing equal protection doctrine, federal laws and
policies that distinguish citizens from foreign nationals receive rational
basis review, while state alienage classifications are subject to strict scrutiny.326 In other words, the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments are noncongruent in alienage cases.327 The standard rationale for this doctrine
is that the federal government, unlike states, has a uniquely “national
interest” in regulating immigration.328 The plenary power doctrine thus
delivers an equal protection jurisprudence in which federal actors may
discriminate in ways that states and localities cannot.
This approach to equal protection turns alienage cases into federalism cases, often with odd results. Take, for example, the contrast between Graham v. Richardson,329 in which the Supreme Court invalidated state laws conditioning benefits on citizenship,330 and Mathews v.
Diaz,331 which upheld citizenship-based restrictions on eligibility for
federal benefits on the ground that equal protection analysis “involves
significantly different considerations” when “it concerns the relationship
between . . . aliens and the Federal Government.”332 Or consider the
ongoing debate over which standard of review ought to apply to alienage
classifications in cooperative state-federal programs like Medicaid.333
As these cases illustrate, equal protection analysis of alienage begins not
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
325 Judith Resnik, Essay, Categorical Federalism: Jurisdiction, Gender, and the Globe, 111 YALE
L.J. 619, 619–20 (2001) (describing a mode of reasoning in which laws are described as “about” one
subject and then, on that ground, deemed to fall within the exclusive province of one level of
government).
326 Korab v. Fink, 797 F.3d 572, 577–78 (9th Cir. 2014) (first citing In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717,
719–22 (1973); and then citing Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88, 103 (1976)). There are
several exceptions to this rule. Where a classification applies to a “political function,” state laws
receive rational basis review. Cabell v. Chavez-Salido, 454 U.S. 432, 439–40 (1982); see also Ambach
v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68, 74 (1979). Several circuit courts have also applied rational basis scrutiny
to state alienage classifications after finding that Congress had authorized states to adopt distinctions based on alienage. See, e.g., Korab, 572 F.3d at 583–84 (reviewing Hawaii’s “discretionary
decision” to revoke Medicaid benefits from noncitizen residents); Soskin v. Reinertson, 353 F.3d
1242, 1255 (10th Cir. 2004) (reviewing a Colorado law making certain noncitizens ineligible for
Medicaid).
327 See Victor C. Romero, The Congruence Principle Applied: Rethinking Equal Protection Review of Federal Alienage Classifications After Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Peña, 76 OR. L. REV.
425, 426–27 (1997); Brian Soucek, The Return of Noncongruent Equal Protection, 83 FORDHAM L.
REV. 155, 171 (2014).
328 Hampton, 426 U.S. at 100.
329 403 U.S. 365.
330 Id. at 376.
331 426 U.S. 67 (1976).
332 Id. at 84–85.
333 See Korab v. Fink, 797 F.3d 572, 584–87 (9th Cir. 2014) (Bybee, J., concurring and concurring
in the judgment) (summarizing this debate); see also Bruns v. Mayhew, 750 F.3d 61, 66 (1st Cir.
2014) (describing alienage restrictions on Medicaid in Maine as a “Gordian knot of federal and state
legislation”).
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with a question about the harm at issue in state-sponsored discrimination, but with a question about which level of government chose to discriminate. This is an unusually structural way to conceptualize equal
protection rights.
Courts, moreover, engage in almost no analysis of the distinctions
between federal actors. The dominant, noncongruent approach to equal
protection means that any federal government entity imposing an alienage classification is entitled to rational basis review.334 The Supreme
Court hinted at a limit to this rule in Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong,335 a
1976 case in which the Court invalidated a Civil Service Commission
(CSC) regulation restricting federal civil service jobs to United States
citizens.336 In an enigmatic decision, the Hampton Court held that the
regulation violated the Due Process Clause because the CSC — an
agency with “no responsibility for foreign affairs, for treaty negotiations,
for establishing immigration quotas or conditions of entry, or for naturalization policies”337 — lacked authority to draw alienage distinctions.338 Although Hampton is typically read as a nondelegation case,
the decision contains soaring language that suggests a more robust limit
on which types of agencies can claim the benefits of the plenary power
doctrine.339 The case, however, remains an exception to the general rule:
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
334 See Bruns, 750 F.3d at 66 (“[C]ongressional disparate treatment of aliens is presumed to rest
on national immigration policy rather than invidious discrimination.” (citing Mathews, 426 U.S. at
79–80)); Hamad v. Gates, 732 F.3d 990, 1005–06 (9th Cir. 2013). Although courts could limit deferential review to alienage classifications drawn by Congress, they have not done so, instead describing the immigration power as vested in “the political branches” of the federal government. See,
e.g., Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 225 (1982) (quoting Mathews, 426 U.S. at 81).
335 426 U.S. 88 (1976).
336 Id. at 116–17.
337 Id. at 114.
338 Id. at 116 (noting that the national interests that might “justify the exclusion of noncitizens
from the federal service” could not “reasonably be assumed to have influenced,” id. at 104, an agency
whose “only concern . . . is the promotion of an efficient federal service,” id. at 114). The Hampton
complaint also named as defendants the Postal Service, the General Service Administration, and
the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare. Id. at 92 n.3. Justice Stevens noted that none
of those agencies could “reasonably be assumed” to have been influenced by the national interests
that constitute the immigration power. Id. at 104–05.
339 After the Supreme Court decided Hampton, President Ford issued an executive order imposing the same alienage classification, which lower courts upheld and the Supreme Court declined to
review. See Citizenship Requirements for Federal Employment, 41 Fed. Reg. 37,303 (Sept. 3, 1976);
see also Mow Sun Wong v. Hampton, 435 F. Supp. 37, 46 (N.D. Cal. 1977), aff’d sub nom. Mow Sun
Wong v. Campbell, 626 F.2d 739 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 959 (1981); Aziz Z. Huq, The
Institution Matching Canon, 106 NW. U. L. REV. 417, 431–35 (2012) (discussing Hampton and its
afterlife). This history makes the nondelegation reading of Hampton compelling. Nonetheless,
Hampton’s broad language suggests that, in striking down the CSC regulation, the Court was concerned not only with statutory authorization but also with the Agency’s institutional purpose. See
Hampton, 426 U.S. at 101–03 (“We do not agree . . . that the federal power over aliens is so plenary
that any agent of the National Government may arbitrarily subject all resident aliens to different
substantive rules from those applied to citizens. . . . When the Federal Government asserts an overriding national interest as justification for a discriminatory rule . . . due process requires that there
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courts take a categorical approach to the federal immigration power,
extending the authority to do migration control — and the deference
that comes with it — to anyone with a federal job.
All-foreign prisons sit at the crosshairs of these deference doctrines.
These prisons are protected from standard judicial review both as prisons and as sites of federal immigration policy, that is, both by the penal
power doctrine and by the plenary power doctrine. As a result, alienage
discrimination that would be hard to justify in many other contexts (imagine separate and worse state hospitals or public schools for foreigners)
would face much less demanding scrutiny if challenged in court. Perhaps for this reason, advocacy organizations that one might expect to
challenge the all-foreign prison have not done so.340
To be clear, a court would not have to uphold all-foreign prisons
under existing precedent. There is a colorable case that these institutions violate equal protection law, particularly if you take seriously the
equality principle embedded in Wong Wing and the Johnson Court’s
suggestion that ethnic segregation of prisons threatens the integrity of
the criminal justice system. All-foreign prisons bear an uncomfortable
resemblance to prisons segregated by race and, for that matter, to the
internment camps that gave rise to Korematsu v. United States,341 a case
in the anticanon of constitutional law.342 The origins and population of
these prisons make it strange to conceptualize them solely as sites of
alienage classification.
Even when framed that way, moreover, the stated justification for
all-foreign prisons — facilitating deportation — is weak given that they
hold some prisoners for decades (or life) and exist alongside expansive
programs to identify and deport noncitizens convicted of crimes. Rational basis with bite, or even a straightforward analysis that takes the
history of these prisons into account, would be enough to conclude that
segregation by citizenship is less a means of border control than a new
philosophy of punishment. The claim is not that all-foreign prisons have
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
be a legitimate basis for presuming that the rule was actually intended to serve that interest.”); id.
at 115 (noting that negotiating treaties and incentivizing naturalization “are not matters which are
properly the business of the Commission”). This discussion of agencies’ “proper business” hints at
a richer theory of how the Constitution limits immigration power in the administrative state than
courts usually recognize. Indeed, on this more expansive reading, Hampton would support a much
more robust set of horizontal limits on the federal immigration power.
340 By contrast, noncitizens have challenged their ineligibility for rehabilitative programs and
early release, but courts have avoided the deep question these policies raise by holding that prison
regulations classify prisoners not by alienage but “as those who have ICE detainers against them
and those who do not.” See Gallegos-Hernandez v. United States, 688 F.3d 190, 196 (5th Cir. 2012);
see also McLean v. Crabtree, 173 F.3d 1176, 1185 (9th Cir. 1999).
341 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
342 See Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2423 (2018) (stating that Korematsu “has been overruled in the court of history”); see also Richard A. Primus, Essay, Canon, Anti-Canon, and Judicial
Dissent, 48 DUKE L.J. 243, 245 (1998) (identifying the anticanon); Jamal Greene, The Anticanon,
125 HARV. L. REV. 379, 400–02 (2011) (discussing Korematsu’s uneasy place within it).

1432

HARVARD LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 132:1379

to survive rational basis review, though it is worth being honest about
just how deferential the Turner standard is in practice.
This Part advances a more modest and perhaps more troubling observation about the state of constitutional doctrine: fifty years after
courts began to desegregate prisons, and notwithstanding a large body
of law attaching constitutional significance to the distinction between
punishment and deportation, it remains entirely plausible for a court to
hold that the intentional isolation of foreign national prisoners, which
results in ethnic segregation of federal prisons, does not offend the
Constitution at all.
C. Federal Prison as Foreign Land
Ultimately, deference doctrines leave foreign national prisoners’
rights underdetermined. From legal opinions, it is unclear when prisons
can be segregated; whether alienage discrimination in prison housing
violates equal protection; and even whether noncitizens are protected
from cruel and unusual punishment.343 In prison regulations, by contrast, the government has taken specific positions on each of these issues.
As Part I demonstrated, federal prison officials have spent the last decade making increasingly fine-grained decisions about when noncitizens
are entitled to equal treatment in penal institutions — to education, early
release, proximity to home, and integrated housing.
This is constitutional interpretation through prison policy. All-foreign
prisons are a vivid example of administrative constitutionalism, a form
of legal development in which administrative actors construct the
Constitution’s meaning.344 These prisons offer a window into the way
that bureaucrats (here, prison officials) determine the rights and benefits
associated with citizenship status, and thus regulate the terms of membership in the American polity. In restricting a growing number of the
“benefits” of punishment to citizens, the Bureau of Prisons has developed its own interpretation of the constitutional right to equal protection
and its own equality norms. The Agency has, in other words, filled in
the gaps where courts have been reluctant to clarify the scope of noncitizens’ substantive rights. From this perspective, foreign national pris–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
343
344

See supra note 270.
See Gillian E. Metzger, Administrative Constitutionalism, 91 TEX. L. REV. 1897 (2013). One
might ask whether these officials are interpreting the Constitution or merely ignoring it, confident
that courts will not police their choices. Following Professors Gillian Metzger and Kristin Collins,
I take an expansive approach to the processes and decisions that count as administrative constitutionalism on the ground that government actors elaborate constitutional meaning both when they
interpret the Constitution explicitly and when their policies effectively shape the content of constitutional rights. See Collins, supra note 40, at 1731–32; Metzger, supra, at 1900. For those who
prefer the narrower brand of administrative constitutionalism, the core point holds: deference doctrines give prison officials tremendous authority to decide when foreign national prisoners are entitled to equal treatment.
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oners’ equal protection rights are not nearly as underdetermined as constitutional doctrine makes them seem. Instead these rights are elaborated, often in great detail, by the administrative officials who decide
when and how citizenship status matters to people’s interactions
with the state. The real effect of deference doctrines, then, is that federal
prison officials become enormously important interpreters of the
Constitution.
In courts, meanwhile, federal prisons start to look like foreign territory. The penal power doctrine and the plenary power doctrine distort
judicial review — which is not to say that courts altogether decline to
review federal prison policy on noncitizens, but rather that deference
doctrines make courts’ first question whether traditional constitutional
principles ought to apply to exceptional plaintiffs in an exceptional institution. Take the Turner doctrine: the first step of that test asks
whether the right in question survives incarceration, which means, of
course, that some (and in practice many) rights do not.345 Similarly, the
plenary power doctrine assumes that the Constitution carries less force
when invoked by a noncitizen. This framework for constitutional analysis is familiar from cases involving extraterritorial application of the
Constitution, a context in which courts often debate the Constitution’s
reach. Courts have long been divided over whether and how constitutional rights apply in places like Mexico,346 England,347 Bagram Air
Base,348 and Guantanamo Bay.349 The suggestion here is that, although
we typically conceive of prisons as domestic criminal justice institutions,
constitutional doctrine treats the all-foreign prison as equally foreign
land.

–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
345
346

See supra pp. 1424–26.
See, e.g., Hernandez v. Mesa, 137 S. Ct. 2003, 2007–08 (2017) (declining to decide whether a
“cross-border incident in which a United States Border Patrol agent standing on United States soil
shot and killed a Mexican national standing on Mexican soil,” id. at 2004, violated the victim’s
Fourth or Fifth Amendment rights); United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 261 (1990)
(holding that the Fourth Amendment does not apply “to the search and seizure by United States
agents of property that is owned by a nonresident alien and located in a foreign country”); Rodriguez
v. Swartz, 899 F.3d 719, 731 (9th Cir. 2018) (holding that a Mexican national on Mexican soil had a
Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable use of deadly force by an American Border
Patrol agent standing across the border in the United States).
347 See, e.g., Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 3–5 (1957) (holding that the Fifth and Sixth Amendments
extended to a U.S. citizen military spouse tried for the murder of her husband on an American air
base in England).
348 See, e.g., Al Maqaleh v. Gates, 605 F.3d 84, 98 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (“[The writ of habeas corpus]
does not extend to the Bagram confinement [of detainees] in an active theater of war in a territory
under neither the de facto nor de jure sovereignty of the United States and within the territory of
another de jure sovereign.”).
349 See, e.g., id. at 90–94 (summarizing habeas cases concerning Guantanamo Bay, from Rasul v.
Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004), to Boumediene v. Bush, 533 U.S. 723 (2008)).
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IV. TOWARD A THEORY OF MIGRATION CONTROL
Part III described a doctrinal minefield in which a deeply concerning
form of custody receives two kinds of judicial deference. As Johnson
demonstrates, one of these deference regimes — the penal power doctrine — sometimes yields, and famously did so when prison segregation
was at issue.350 But even if courts relaxed their prison exceptionalism,
all-foreign prisons would still be protected by an expansive conception
of the federal immigration power. Notwithstanding the Supreme
Court’s decision in Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, courts have never clarified which types of federal action constitute migration control, nor have
they limited which agents of the federal government may invoke the
plenary power doctrine to justify their policies. This approach extends
plenary power all the way across the administrative state, not just to
federal prisons but to all federal alienage rules. The authority to regulate migration thus becomes one of the broadest federal powers, and
noncitizens’ right to equal protection recedes any time the federal government acts.
This Part advances an alternative theory of migration control, one
that helps to square equal protection concerns about prison segregation
with the fact that some alienage discrimination is necessary in a nationstate. Below, I explain why a formal definition of migration control is
a better solution to the puzzle of noncitizens’ simultaneous equality and
second-class status than the “federalism-tinged” equal protection doctrine courts now use.351 I then defend a simple claim: the immigration
power is at issue only when the government decides who may enter,
exit, and naturalize. This means that all-foreign prisons are not an instance of migration control, at least not the kind of migration control
that warrants deference from federal courts.
A. Why Theory?
At first, a formal theory of migration control may sound counterproductive. Academics tend to use terms like “migration control,” “border
control,” and “immigration regulation” capaciously to describe many
sorts of state action directed at noncitizens. The insight driving this
approach is that state power is diffuse. Certainly, provisions in the
Immigration and Nationality Act352 setting out who may enter the country and who must be deported are examples of migration control. But
so too are university policies on whether immigrants qualify for in-state

–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
350
351
352

See supra pp. 1421–24.
See Soucek, supra note 327, at 158.
Pub. L. No. 89-236, 79 Stat. 911 (1965) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.).
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tuition,353 workplace rules on whether employees must speak English,354
and prison policies categorizing federal prisoners by citizenship status.
All of these legal rules are forms of social control that regulate migrants’
status and mobility.
Adam Cox has articulated an incisive version of this point.355 In a
powerful piece exploring the distinction between immigration and alienage rules — a distinction that shapes the way immigration law is conceptualized and taught356 — Cox argues that there is no meaningful
difference between laws governing admission and expulsion (immigration rules) and those governing noncitizens’ treatment inside the country
(alienage rules) because both affect immigrants’ conduct.357 To illustrate
his claim, Cox uses the example of an immigration law that “privileges
migrants who will work in a particular industry.”358 Such a law, Cox
explains, might encourage immigrants to pursue certain careers in order
to obtain admission to the United States.359 Conversely, a law restricting
immigrants’ access to public benefits — a quintessential alienage law —
might disincentivize migration into the country.360 Thus, any legal rule
related to noncitizens is a means of regulating the border. Some means
are simply more direct than others.
From this observation, Cox derives a normative claim: there is no
reason “to ascribe constitutional or moral significance” to the distinction
between immigration and alienage laws.361 As Cox sees it, efforts to
carve out a set of immigration rules and to distinguish those “real” instances of migration control from other types of state action are misguided because there is no legally salient difference between the state’s
many strategies for regulating migrants’ lives.
This functionalist understanding of immigration law makes sense.
There is no deep empirical difference between policing entry and exit
and treating migrants differently from citizens inside the United States.
But it is not clear where the functionalist argument ends — whether, for
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
353 See Toll v. Moreno, 458 U.S. 1, 17 (1982) (holding that the federal law providing for G-4 visas
preempted a University of Maryland policy denying eligibility for in-state tuition to noncitizens
with such visas); In-State Tuition and Unauthorized Immigrant Students, NAT’L CONF. ST.
LEGISLATURES (Feb. 9, 2014), http://www.ncsl.org/research/immigration/in-state-tuition-andunauthorized-immigrants.aspx [https://perma.cc/D9W4-VJ8H] (surveying tuition policies across the
country).
354 See Cristina M. Rodríguez, Language Diversity in the Workplace, 100 NW. U. L. REV. 1689,
1697–702 (2006) (summarizing the history of English-only workplace rules in the United States).
355 See Adam B. Cox, Immigration Law’s Organizing Principles, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 341 (2008).
356 See generally id. (collecting case law and scholarship on the distinction between immigration
and alienage law).
357 Id. at 357–76; see also id. at 351–53.
358 Id. at 363.
359 Id.
360 Id. at 364–65.
361 Id. at 342.
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instance, it extends to alienage-neutral laws with a disparate impact on
migrants or laws enforced more against immigrants than others. If those
laws count, almost any law could be a mode of migration control. And
in any event, the absence of a functional difference between two types
of state action does not mean there ought to be no constitutional difference between the two. In fact, there are good reasons to classify only
core immigration activities — setting rules on entry, exit, and naturalization — as migration control and to insist that, as a matter of constitutional law, other activities are not.
The first is that courts need a more defensible way to make sense of
equality in a political community organized around the nation-state. As
Part III pointed out, any law concerning immigrants implicates two
competing principles: the equal protection guarantee and the government’s authority to establish national borders and determine the terms
of political membership.362 When faced with any statute, regulation, or
policy on noncitizens, courts have to balance the prohibition on denying
noncitizens equal protection against the proposition that the federal government may divide foreigners from citizens in order to constitute itself.
The only way to accomplish this balancing act is to distinguish between
action that counts as migration control and action that does not.
A formal theory of migration control is thus a pragmatic solution to
a thorny legal problem. There is no sharp functional distinction between
rules on admission, expulsion, and immigrants’ treatment in the United
States. Nor, for that matter, are there actual borders to the nation-state
in the absence of law. These are all invented boundaries. But law is
always a line-drawing exercise. The law governing noncitizens is filled
with formalisms — to cite a few, immigration detention and deportation
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
362 It is worth addressing whether these are constitutional principles. A state’s duty not to “deny
to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws,” U.S. CONST. amend. XIV,
§ 1, derives from the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause, which courts have extended to the federal government by way of the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause, see Bolling
v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499–500 (1954). The federal immigration power has less sure textual footing. The Constitution nowhere says that the federal government has authority to regulate immigration, not to mention sole authority over the issue. Courts typically describe the federal immigration power as the outgrowth of multiple enumerated powers bestowed on Congress, including
the authority to regulate foreign commerce and set naturalization rules, and as an inherent feature
of national sovereignty. See, e.g., Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. 387, 394–95 (2012) (“Th[e]
[federal government’s] authority [over immigration] rests, in part, on the National Government’s . . .
inherent power as sovereign to control and conduct relations with foreign nations . . . .”); Harisiades
v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 587–88 (1952) (describing the power to deport noncitizens as “inherent
in every sovereign state”). In the latter formulation, the government’s authority to exclude noncitizens is an extraconstitutional principle, embedded in the very idea of a nation-state. Although the
idea of inherent authority to establish borders is deeply interesting (and more than a little problematic), one need not settle the constitutional status of the federal immigration power
to appreciate that every law concerning noncitizens raises both equal protection and sovereignty
concerns.
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are not “punishment”;363 immigrants paroled into the United States have
never “entered” the country;364 and the “border” within which customs
agents can stop and search vehicles extends 100 miles inland.365 Like
most legal fictions, these rules benefit the state: the definition of punishment narrows the constitutional protections that apply in deportation
proceedings; the entry fiction governing parolees limits their due process
rights; and the 100-mile rule expands border patrol well inside the country’s geographic boundaries.
Formal rules ought to limit state power, too. Constitutional immigration law begins from a paradox: for citizenship to mean anything,
discrimination against noncitizens must be permissible; but for the equal
protection guarantee to have content, discrimination against noncitizens
can go only so far. When the federal government makes law, courts
more or less ignore this paradox, prioritizing sovereignty values above
all else. This doctrine lacks a solid foundation, and as the all-foreign
prison illustrates, has unsettling consequences. In a legal system where
immigrants are at once unequal and entitled to equal protection, the law
needs a theory of migration control.
The second reason to distinguish migration control from other species of government conduct is that, in the absence of a clear theory of
migration control, courts have adopted a haphazard jurisprudence that
elevates all federal actors to immigration policymakers entitled to rational basis review. Current equal protection doctrine imposes no horizontal limits on plenary power. This approach embarrasses the traditional justification for deference to agency officials, which is that
administrators have expertise that courts lack.366 It also means, for example, that the Bureau of Land Management could rely on the plenary
power doctrine to explain a policy denying noncitizens access to federal
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
363 Mahler v. Eby, 264 U.S. 32, 39 (1924) (“It is well settled that deportation . . . is not a punishment.”). Although the Court held in Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356 (2010), that the Sixth
Amendment requires criminal lawyers to inform their clients of the immigration consequences of a
conviction, id. at 369, courts continue to distinguish deportation from punishment when determining whether constitutional protections attach to immigration proceedings, see, e.g., Hinds v. Lynch,
790 F.3d 259, 263 (1st Cir. 2015) (“[F]ederal courts have long described removal orders as nonpunitive and, therefore, not punishment. . . . [W]e reject [the] contention that Padilla heralded a
dramatic change in this long-settled view.”).
364 Section 212(d)(5) of the Immigration and Nationality Act permits immigration authorities to
“parole” into the United States noncitizens who would otherwise be ineligible for admission. 8
U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5) (2012). Courts treat parolees as if they have never entered. See, e.g., Sheba v.
Green, No. 16-230, 2016 WL 3648000, at *2 (D.N.J. July 7, 2016) (“[A]n alien who is paroled for
later inspection is not deemed to have been admitted or to have legally entered the country.”).
365 8 C.F.R. § 287.1 (2018) (construing 8 U.S.C. § 1357(a)(3)).
366 See, e.g., Talk Am., Inc. v. Mich. Bell Tel. Co., 564 U.S. 50, 66 n.7 (2011) (citing “greater
expertise” as the rationale for deference to the Federal Communications Commission); Gonzales v.
Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 266 (2006) (“[H]istorical familiarity and policymaking expertise account in
the first instance for the presumption that Congress delegates interpretive lawmaking power to the
agency rather than the reviewing court . . . .” (quoting Martin v. Occupational Safety & Health
Review Comm’n, 499 U.S. 144, 153 (1991))).
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parks; that the Department of Veterans Affairs could cite immigration
control to segregate VA hospitals; and that the National Railroad
Passenger Corporation could defend a policy charging noncitizens more
to ride on Amtrak as an instance of border control. To put a slightly
finer point on it, governing immigration doctrine means that all-foreign
federal prisons can be described as an exercise in immigration regulation
even if they make it no easier for the government to find and deport
noncitizens convicted of crimes.
One might object that these examples are far-fetched. It would be
strange indeed for Amtrak to segregate its trains, and even if it did, a
court could deem such a policy irrational. But the concern is not that
all federal alienage classifications will necessarily survive rational basis
review; it is that, when it comes to federal policy, noncitizens’ equality
depends in large measure on administrative discretion. Segregated
Amtrak trains and national parks seem outlandish not because the law
clearly prevents them, but because our legal system operates on latent
assumptions about which agencies “do border control” and when discrimination against noncitizens is permissible. Noncitizens’ equality, in
other words, is often a matter of norms rather than enforceable constitutional rights.
This is a real problem when norms change. The central claim in
Part I was that norms around the use of penal institutions have shifted
over the last three decades, turning prisons into tools of immigration
policy and encouraging prison officials to justify segregated prisons as
border control despite little evidence that they facilitate deportation. It
is not difficult to imagine similar transformations in different parts of
the federal bureaucracy. When this sort of institutional change unfolds,
equal protection doctrine offers little insurance against an increasingly
stratified society. Instead, under the governing theory of migration control, the plenary power doctrine applies to federal action no matter how
attenuated it is from the government’s interest in making and policing
national borders. This is a blunt way to distribute constitutional power.
And it produces outcomes — such as deference to federal prison officials
when state prison officials get none — that are just as formal as the line
between immigration and alienage rules, and far more perverse.
B. Which Theory?
The question, then, is when state action ought to count as migration
control. Is the long-term segregation of foreign national prisoners related to the state’s sovereign authority to regulate national borders? Is
this prison policy a form of immigration regulation to which the plenary
power doctrine should apply? If not, why not? When, in short, are
federal citizenship laws entitled to deference?
There are many possible answers to these questions. It could be that
deference is never justified in constitutional immigration law — this is
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the argument for unqualified equal protection rights for noncitizens.
Although I am sensitive to the goals of this argument, which aims to
correct a jurisprudence that tolerates widespread discrimination, I am
skeptical that courts would abandon deference to immigration policymakers in all cases. At least as a theory of judicial review, the plenary
power doctrine is tenacious; it has warped and faded over time, but as
the recent holding in Trump v. Hawaii367 and the ongoing legal debate
over policies limiting unauthorized immigrants’ access to abortion368 illustrate, it remains a powerful framework for understanding the government’s obligations to noncitizens.
More to the point, the legal rule cannot be that immigrants are always equal to citizens. That approach to equal protection would eviscerate citizenship. So long as there is a nation-state, equal protection
cannot preclude any second-class treatment of immigrants, for citizenship is itself a caste system.
But nor should the rule be that any federal alienage discrimination
receives the extraordinary treatment that comes with classifying state
action as migration control. That approach obscures the constitutional
commitment to noncitizens’ equality and assumes without good reason
that the right to equal protection matters less when the federal government infringes it. It oversimplifies the federal government, which in a
world of administrative agencies is a vast and varied idea. And it runs
roughshod over the intuition that some forms of state coercion are not
really “border control” even if they have an indirect effect on immigrants’ behavior and status.
Courts thus need a rule that recognizes noncitizens’ legitimate claims
to equality, the basic inequality inherent to the nation-state, and the
complexity of the modern administrative state. Here I propose a distinction between laws concerning which immigrants enter, exit, and naturalize, and all other laws affecting immigrants in the United States.369
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
367 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2409 (2018) (upholding the Trump Administration’s ban on entry of noncitizens from seven predominantly Muslim nations on the ground that “searching inquiry into the persuasiveness of the President’s justifications is inconsistent with the broad statutory text and the
deference traditionally accorded the President in th[e] [immigration] sphere”).
368 The D.C. Circuit recently split over whether an undocumented minor was protected by Roe
v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). Garza v. Hargan, 874 F.3d 735, 743 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (en banc)
(Henderson, J., dissenting) (“Does an alien minor who attempts to enter the United States eight
weeks pregnant — and who is immediately apprehended and then in custody for 36 days between
arriving and filing a federal suit — have a constitutional right to an elective abortion? . . . [A]t least
to me the answer is plainly — and easily — no. To conclude otherwise rewards lawlessness and
erases the fundamental difference between citizenship and illegal presence in our country.”), vacated
sub nom. Azar v. Garza, 138 S. Ct. 1790 (2018).
369 Note that the Constitution expressly empowers Congress to “establish an uniform Rule of
Naturalization.” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4. The Naturalization Clause provides some textual
support for a theory that places naturalization decisions within the core of the federal immigration
power.
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The former laws are threshold rules that set out who may (or in the case
of deportation must) cross the territorial border of the nation-state and
the legal border between foreignness and citizenship. All other rules
concerning noncitizens affect where and how immigrants live, but do so
only incidentally, as a consequence of regulating migrants’ access to social goods like welfare benefits, jobs, public schools, and prison services.
Because they implicate sovereignty less directly, the latter rules ought
not be classified as forms of migration control to which deference applies. When in doubt, moreover, the presumption ought to be that a
law, policy, or regulation is not an instance of migration control that can
be explained by reference to the federal immigration power.
This theory of migration control revives and clarifies the familiar
distinction between immigration and alienage law. Both constitutional
doctrine and immigration scholarship have long acknowledged a difference between regulating immigrants’ entry into the United States and
determining how noncitizens can be treated once they arrive.370 As
Cox’s functionalist argument demonstrates, scholars have serious debates about whether courts can draw a coherent line between these
modes of regulation.371 My assertion is that they can — and indeed
must — in order to separate the kind of alienage discrimination that is
necessary to the function of the American legal system from alienage
discrimination that reflects a racialized and constitutionally impermissible distaste for foreigners. Although the boundary between these types
of discrimination will never be entirely clear, a theory that distinguishes
threshold from incidental regulation of immigrants (and presumes strict
scrutiny in borderline cases) does a significantly better job of filtering
out noxious forms of discrimination than the doctrine courts currently
employ.
Put differently, this theory of migration control gives meaning to the
equal protection guarantee at the federal level, where the balance between equality and sovereignty is severely off-kilter. Under this theory,
many federal alienage classifications would be subject to strict scrutiny
rather than deferential review, and government conduct that indirectly
affects immigrants’ mobility could not be rationalized as an exercise of
the federal immigration power. This does not mean that alienage classifications could never be justified. But it does mean that, outside a
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
370 Professor Linda Bosniak describes this as the “fundamental doctrinal division between immigration law’s ‘inside’ and its ‘outside.’” Linda S. Bosniak, Membership, Equality, and the Difference that Alienage Makes, 69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1047, 1058 (1994); see also BOSNIAK, supra note 272,
at 55–56; Stephen H. Legomsky, Immigration Law and the Principle of Plenary Congressional
Power, 1984 SUP. CT. REV. 255, 256 (distinguishing “immigration law” from “the more general law
of aliens’ rights and obligations”); Hiroshi Motomura, Immigration and Alienage, Federalism and
Proposition 187, 35 VA. J. INT’L L. 201, 202 (1994) (discussing the “elusive” line between alienage
and immigration rules). My work builds from this line of scholarship.
371 See supra pp. 1434–35.
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limited set of contexts, the government would need a compelling justification to discriminate on the basis of citizenship — and “regulating the
border” would be an impermissible rationale.
In some respects, this is an atypical way to think about equal protection. This is not the “highly individualistic view of rights” most often
associated with the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.372 This theory
treats equal protection as a structural principle that creates boundaries
between different domains of state action, such as punishment and border control, and restricts the rationales that federal actors can give to
justify policies in each.
As section III.B noted, however, courts already take a structural approach to equal protection when citizenship is at issue.373 And this mode
of reasoning is not nearly as exotic as it first seems. Although they rarely
make it explicit, courts frequently employ rights to limit the acceptable
reasons for government policy in certain contexts. Consider, for instance, First Amendment doctrine on campaign finance. In that area of
law, the Supreme Court has dramatically restricted the permissible justifications for regulation of the political process, setting off-limits rationales that the government could otherwise use to explain its actions.374
Similarly, in prison law, courts require policy to be justified by a “penological” goal.375 In both of these examples, rights distinguish different
domains of state action. As Professor Richard Pildes puts it, rights are
the “means of marking separate spheres of authority in order to realize
[competing] values”; they are the “tools the American legal system has
created” to police which reasons are excluded from particular legal
spheres.376 The claim in this Article is that, to realize the competing
values at work in any policy on alienage, migration control can be a
legitimate justification for federal action in only the subset of cases most
closely tied to the government’s sovereign interest in policing its borders.
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
372 See Heather K. Gerken, Understanding the Right to an Undiluted Vote, 114 HARV. L. REV.
1663, 1665 (2001).
373 See supra pp. 1426–31.
374 See McCutcheon v. FEC, 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1450 (2014) (“This Court has identified only one
legitimate governmental interest for restricting campaign finances: preventing corruption or the
appearance of corruption.” (citing Davis v. FEC, 554 U.S. 724, 741 (2008); FEC v. Nat’l Conservative Political Action Comm., 470 U.S. 480, 496–97 (1985))). The goal here is not to defend campaign
finance doctrine but rather to demonstrate that the kind of reasoning I would apply to immigration
law is routine in other areas of constitutional law.
375 See supra pp. 1424–26. Of course, Turner does not restrict state action nearly as much as the
Supreme Court’s campaign finance jurisprudence. But the doctrine does imagine that only a certain
set of rationales — namely, the “legitimate penological objectives of the corrections system” — may
justify prison policy. See Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 95 (1987) (quoting Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S.
817, 822 (1974)).
376 Richard H. Pildes, Avoiding Balancing: The Role of Exclusionary Reasons in Constitutional
Law, 45 HASTINGS L.J. 711, 724 (1994).
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So what does this theory of migration control look like in practice?
For one, it means that all-foreign prisons could not be justified as an
exercise of the federal immigration power, which is how the government
has described them.377 Instead, the Bureau of Prisons would have to
explain why segregating noncitizens in separate, unequal penal institutions is a good prison policy. To be sure, courts are often deferential to
prison officials; Part III described a jurisprudence in which courts have
upheld extremely restrictive penal policies. But if taken seriously, a narrow legal definition of migration control would mean that prison officials could not borrow the plenary power doctrine to justify the creation
of a second-class prison system for foreigners. These prisons would not
receive rational basis review simply because they hold noncitizens. The
case of the all-foreign prison would look much more like Johnson v.
California: these institutions would get strict scrutiny and the question
would be what penological goal authorizes segregation by citizenship.378
All-foreign prisons are difficult to defend from this perspective. As
this Article has shown, segregated prisons are not the only (nor even a
particularly good) way to identify foreign national prisoners or to share
information with ICE. And although they may be a means to reduce
prison costs, surely cost control cannot justify worse treatment and longterm isolation of a protected class of prisoners — if it could, prison officials could channel African-American prisoners into separate prisons
with fewer services to save money. Johnson prevents that outcome and
provides a blueprint for the analysis here.379 In that case and lower
court cases interpreting it, courts have suggested that only prison violence justifies segregating prisoners.380 There is no evidence that allforeign prisons, all of which are low-security institutions, were created
in response to security concerns.
Of course, readers may disagree about how strict scrutiny should
play out. Some might think the state has a compelling interest in restricting prison services to those who will be released into the United
States. Once you accept that proposition, organizing the penal estate to
distribute prison services efficiently seems less objectionable. There is
also the blunter argument for these prisons: the state owes noncitizens
less than citizens and can therefore hold them in second-class institu-

–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
377 See supra pp. 1406–07. Although this Article focuses on prisons, a cabined theory of border
control would mean that a wider range of “noncore” federal alienage regulations — from limits on
access to welfare benefits to the provision of federal licenses — would be subject to strict scrutiny
as well.
378 Cf. 543 U.S. 499, 510–12 (2005).
379 See id.
380 See id. at 512–13; see also cases cited supra note 282 and accompanying text.
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tions that reflect their status as outsiders. So long as these prisons comport with the Eighth Amendment, the argument goes, there is no constitutional problem with this particular form of discrimination.381
My own view is that Wong Wing had it right: the imposition of punishment brings a person into the political community such that one’s
status as an outsider cannot justify differential treatment.382 When the
state claims the power to punish — when it decides to imprison a person
in the United States rather than repatriating or deporting him383 — it
incurs a duty not to distinguish prisoners by alienage. The state, in other
words, cannot have it both ways; a person cannot be American enough
to owe the state his liberty but insufficiently American to deserve equal
treatment while that liberty is deprived. This is both because the right
to punish is a mutual obligation384 and because citizenship segregation
is simply too tied up with racial and ethnic discrimination to comport
with equal protection principles.
Whether this argument is convincing depends, ultimately, on the extent of one’s commitment to the four equality arguments laid out in Part
III.385 Even if one rejects all those arguments, though, the core point
remains: courts ought to evaluate all-foreign prisons as penal institutions
rather than routine sites of border control. The Supreme Court’s categorical conception of the federal immigration power prevents any meaningful assessment of which rights noncitizens have in the criminal justice
system and which duties arise from the state’s authority to punish. A
better theory of migration control would bring these questions to the
fore, and as a result, would generate a more candid and coherent equal
protection jurisprudence.
More broadly, this theory of migration control would mean that
courts play a bigger role in regulating the interagency dynamics of immigration enforcement. The all-foreign prison is a cautionary tale about
what happens when two agencies “pool” the federal immigration
power.386 Slowly but surely, an effort to use prisons to identify foreign
nationals for deportation has developed into a system of formal inequality of prisoners, which has little discernible effect on immigration officials’ ability to deport noncitizens and which raises serious equal protection concerns. Under a narrow legal theory of migration control,
courts would police this sort of mission creep by requiring prison (and
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
381 It is not clear that current conditions in all-foreign prisons satisfy the Eighth Amendment,
but that concern (while real and urgent) is orthogonal to the point here.
382 See supra section III.A, pp. 1419–24.
383 See Kaufman, supra note 177 (discussing the nonuse of existing repatriation treaties).
384 See NEUMAN, supra note 317, at 8 (describing a constitutional theory under which “rights
are prerequisites for justifying legal obligation”).
385 See supra pp. 1427–28 (describing moral, legal, historical, and practical arguments for noncitizens’ equality).
386 See Daphna Renan, Pooling Powers, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 211, 285 (2015) (discussing the
risks of interagency power sharing).
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other federal) officials who coordinate with immigration agents to justify
their alienage policies without reference to the federal immigration
power.
This approach to plenary power requires the judiciary to oversee
executive branch decisions about the treatment of immigrants. In this
respect, it departs from traditional, expertise-based arguments for deference to agencies like the Bureau of Prisons. But expertise is beside
the point here. Prison officials may have become very good at doing
migration control over the last thirty years, but that does not make segregation by citizenship a permissible exercise of the federal immigration
power. Instead, the real and inevitable question raised by all-foreign
prisons is how to balance conflicting constitutional commitments to
equality and sovereignty. That inquiry falls squarely within the judiciary’s ken.
CONCLUSION
The rise of the all-foreign prison has transformed the federal prison
system. Today, half of the noncitizens in federal prison live in segregated
institutions, and prison officials have embraced a model of punishment
in which equality is a privilege of citizenship. This new penology demands a critical reassessment of the relationship between punishment
and migration control. Federal prisons are deeply involved in American
immigration policy. In some cases, however, they must be judged as sites
of punishment, lest sovereignty swallow the equal protection guarantee.
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